Following the path of Popova’s (2015) enactive approach to narrative, this inquiry focuses on two clusters of metaphors around which Herodotus organized his perceptions about isonomia and demokratia: the cognitive and the pragmatic. Instead of highlighting differences between isonomia and demokratia, we wish to evince cumulative interactions between both concepts, a process that allows us to make sense of one — demokratia — through the other — isonomia. This approach is also helpful to transpose ancient meditations upon democracy to contemporary contexts not because ancient and contemporary democracies look similar, but because those meditations are constituent.

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parts of the democracy-metaphors we currently live by, and whose roots one can see in the attributes Herodotus ascribed to it in III 80-82 and V 66-73.

Key words: isonomia; democracy; enaction; metaphor; Herodotus.

1. Introduction

What does democracy imply when a man like Otanes puts it forward and a few moments later, after seeing himself unable to enforce his original proposition, re-configures it as a sort of «private democracy» exclusive for his private house? Would there be any significative difference between isonomia, the very word Herodotus employed to allegedly report Otanes’ original phrasing, and demokratia, the word he uses to refer to Cleisthenes’ new Athenian configuration? How similar or distinct was Otanes’ initiatives from Cleisthenes’, and with which consequences respectively for isonomia and demokratia? How does this perception impact our understanding about Herodotus’ understanding of democracy? And how can it still help us understand and promote democratic-oriented practices?

This text addresses such questions through an enactive approach of Herodotus’ so-called Persian debate (III 80-82), its immediate outcomes, and Cleisthenes’ digression (V 66-73). Instead of focusing on philological issues of content and structure or on the debate’s Nachleben, we intend to parse and analyze the cognitive and pragmatic metaphors by means of which Herodotus concocts his understanding of both isonomia and demokratia. The text focuses on his narrativity, the intentional construction of stories with which at the same time Herodotus creates sense out of a mass of dispersed information and so invites his receivers to analogous sense-making processes.

Inquiries on what Herodotus allegedly reported and how he structured those passages have been conducted by many scholars in recent years1. A
hermeneutical approach that highlights the text’s metaphors by taking into account the debate’s strategic position in book III has not yet been tried, though. Indeed, when one examines the roles the historian ascribed to Otanes and Darius—the leading speakers whose decisive attitudes along book III are closely intertwined and have led straight to that debate and its unpredictable outcomes—one’s perception about isonomia is immediately challenged. The isonomia Herodotus ascribes to Otanes will emerge as a notion complementary to that of democracy as a system of government derived from popular initiative and enforced by popular power, notwithstanding these very same attributes being voiced by Otanes at the closure of his speech. At the same time, the steps Cleisthenes took to reform Athenian society precisely articulate these very same initiatives, even if not described as democratization by Herodotus.

This research is interdisciplinary and benefits from historiographical and enactive approaches as well. Once combined, the takeaways these approaches are expected to produce may bring new perspectives to studies on both Herodotus’ narrativity and democracy theory. The enactive approach to narrativity formulated by Popova (2015) comprehends narratives as coherent series of reported events oriented by cause-and-effect sequences sometimes articulated by metaphors, always with a telicity, or precise end, in view. Narrativity is the byproduct of participatory sense-making co-involving text and receivers, and an approach centered on it has never been applied to ancient historiographical texts so far².

This inquiry focuses on two clusters of metaphors around which Herodotus seems to have organized his perceptions about isonomia and demokratia: cognitive and pragmatic (discussed below). Otanes and Cleisthenes, the chief characters this text focuses on, will end up as conceptual metonymies through which one can access the constituents of those target metaphors³. Instead of


² For a cognitive approach —Mental Spaces— applied to factual narratives (news) see Van Krieken & Sanders 2019. For analogous approaches —Mediation and Reception Theory— applied to ancient historiographical narratives see respectively Sebastiani 2015, 2017.

³ For conceptual metonymy as «a cognitive process where a source content provides access to a target content within one cognitive domain», see Panther & Thornburg 2014, p. 242.
highlighting differences between *isonomia* and *demokratia* such as the ones already identified by Vlastos (1953, p. 347), Ober (1989, pp. 74-75; 2007, p. 95), Raaflaub (2007, pp. 112-120), Cartledge (2007, pp. 159-163), Roy (2012, p. 308), and Olivera (2016, p. 165), we wish to evince cumulative interactions between both concepts and the way they allow us to make sense of one —*demokratia*— through the other —*isonomia*—. This approach also qualifies for helping us transpose ancient meditations upon democracy to contemporary contexts, not because ancient and contemporary democracies look similar, but because those meditations help form the democracy-metaphors we currently live by, whose roots one can see in the attributes Herodotus ascribed to it in passages like the ones to be discussed.

At the same time, Di Paolo’s (2014) insight on non-sense as background to sense and sense-making will help us postulate meanings for the metaphors enacted by Otanes and Cleisthenes. Two issues within Herodotus’ narrative can only be hinted at through very indirect and disconnected mentions, yet they form the essential background for the kind of political reforms democracy implied by the end of sixth-century B.C.: the dissymmetry between the economic situation of the propositors of democracy and its future beneficiaries, and the prompt communicational interaction between proposers and receivers, so agile and effective as in contemporary online forms, to the point of assimilating contemporary democracies to their ancient and direct homonym forms. Along with Wood (2012), Petrucciani (2014), Patriquin (2015), Mounk (2018), and O’Connor & Weatherall (2019), our inquiry will try to evince the decisive role of economic and communicational factors to triggering democratic reforms, notwithstanding not even being alluded at in Herodotus’ *Histories*.

So this text is accordingly divided into four main subsequent sections. In the next one, we discuss the Persian debate in light of the clues given by Herodotus about Otanes and Darius throughout book III. Our aim is to define the cognitive metaphors embedded in Otanes’ *isonomia*. In section 3, we trace a parallel between former section’s findings and Cleisthenes’ attitudes narrated along V 66-73, thus examining the same metaphors, but now embedded in Herodotus’ *demokratia*. In section 4, we correlate the so far provisory conclusions with pragmatic issues that might have been at stake when *isonomia* and *demokratia* were respectively advocated by Otanes and triggered by Cleisthenes. Finally, in section 5 we sum up the inquiry’s concluding remarks.
2. Otanes and isonomy

Before and after the Persian debate there is at least one capital passage out of which cognitive metaphors cluster around isonomy as advocated by Otanes. We are understanding metaphor as a «thought process that relies on taxonomic relations of similarities», «as a cognitive process of reorganizing experience whereby a set of properties and relations constituting knowledge about one entity are used to think about a new target entity» (Popova 2015, pp. 98 and 102-103). We suggest two kinds of leading metaphors to guide this exam, each involving both isonomy and demokratia and their complementary distinctions. Cognitive metaphors cluster narrative elements about the truthfulness or not of Herodotus’ text, its characters’ original intentions represented as either truthful or not, and the attitudes they take—or not—when advocating isonomy or demokratia. These metaphors explicitly highlight how thinking leads to actions. Pragmatic metaphors, on the other hand, group the ways the same characters could rely on to enforce—or not—their original propositions, and how these ways foment interactions between them and their immediate, intra-narrative receivers. These metaphors highlight, always through indirect allusions, the complementary way round: how material conditions impact thought production. Accordingly, we start with the first block of metaphors. To spot interactions among leading metaphors allows us to build up our current perception of democracy as grounded in truth-seeking, collective construction, aspiration to economic equality, and trustworthy horizontal communication.

In the case of Otanes, cognitive metaphors are the means Herodotus uses to point at the different ways of his dealing with truth or lies in comparison to Darius, then finally advocating isonomy as a consequence of it, however not exclusively. In the end, the «new target entities» to be evinced by the following exam will reveal a coherent pattern: Otanes as a man who changes mind and stance, sliding from a truth-seeker at the beginning, then advocate of isonomy, finally into a paradoxical situation (either coherent with his original intentions or diametrically opposed to them) in the closure of the story; Darius, from beginning to end, remains as the consistent manipulator of truth and lies up until achieving the Persian kingship. The cognitive met-

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4 For metaphors as patterns of conceptual association according to cognitive linguistics see also Grady 2007, Gibbs Jr 2014, Tay 2014.
aphors embedded in Otanes’ character will thus evince the fundamental original link between truth-seeking and isonomia which will be key also to democracy.

To comprehend how Herodotus intentionally articulated a chain of cause-and-effects where the cognitive metaphors are embedded, we must first bear in mind the intellectual environment of relations between truth and lies that constitutes this book. According to Asheri (Asheri et al. 2007, p. 391), «[t]he leitmotif of Book III is, essentially, the metaphysical and moral conflict between falsehood and truth». The commentator then pins down all paragraphs involving truth, lies, and/or deceit, although remarkably leaving out paragraph 80, which begins with a statement by the main narrator, Herodotus, about the truthfulness of the following scene: «[t]here are those in Greece who are not convinced of the authenticity of the speeches that were delivered there, but they did take place» (III 80.1)\(^5\). The so called Persian debate, its antecedents and outcomes, are thus rooted in that cognitive environment, so that isonomia-issues are from the starting part of the cognitive metaphors clustered around truth and lies.

The first encounter between Otanes and Darius in book III is remarkable for its intra-narrative and meta-historiographic implications. The issue at stake for the seven Persian noblemen is how to deal with the usurper Magus. When Darius suggests that the other six should follow him and act immediately, Otanes argues for «a more cautious approach» (ἐπὶ τὸ σωφρονέστερον - III 71.3). Darius then strongly defends his previous advice, even threatening to denounce the plot to the Magus if necessary (III 71.5). So Otanes urges him to show them how to pass by the palace guards (III 72.1), and receives the following reply from Darius:

> Where a lie is necessary, let it be spoken. Our objective is the same whether we use lies or the truth to achieve it. People lie when they expect to profit from others’ falling for their lies, and they tell the truth for the same reason –to attract some profit to themselves or to gain more room to manoeuvre in. In other words, the means may differ but we’re after the same thing. If there’s no profit to be gained, our truth-teller might as well lie and our liar might as well tell the truth (III 72.4-5).

\(^5\) All translations from Herodotus come from Waterfield (Herodotus 1998) unless otherwise stated. All quotations from the original Greek come from Hude’s edition (Herodoti 1927).
It is through this first interaction between the two men that Herodotus presents the intellectual and ethical guidelines which will impact how receivers are invited to understand their role along book III. On the one hand, Otanes personifies the shrewd and prudent man responsible for unmasking the usurper after having his suspicions (ὑπώπτευσε, ὑποπτεύσας - III 68.2) proved correct (III 68-70). On the other, Darius enacts the bold entrepreneur eager to act, with few scruples, a lot of stamina, and with a permanent focus on accumulating power. Like a ἵστωρ, Otanes unmasks the false Smerdis deducing through precise signs (his not having ears - III 69.6) reported by his own daughter. Darius, on the other hand, tools up truth and lies alike by focusing exclusively on the aim at stake (III 72.4; italicized). Besides, in the syntagm «ὁμοίως ἂν ὅ τε ἀληθιζόμενος ψευδὴς εἴη καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος ἀληθής», εἴη is ambivalent. An alternative translation, implying that one can be both truthful or liar at the same time, would say in a slightly different manner but far more incisively the palindrome: «the truthful one would be a liar, and conversely the liar, truthful». Through Darius’ mouth Herodotus forges a historiographical version of the «liar paradox», a kind of behavior perfectly illustrative of what the future king will perform in the next paragraphs.

After slaughtering the usurper and being greeted by a people who replicates the attitude, slaughtering the other Magi (III 79.2-3), three of the seven Persian noblemen discuss «the general state of things» (III 80.1). Then

Otanes recommended entrusting the management of the country to the Persian people. ... A monarch subverts a country’s ancestral customs, takes women against their will, and kills men without trial. What about majority rule, on the other hand? In the first place, it has the best of all names to describe it —equality before the law. In the second place, it is entirely free of the vices of monarchy. It is government by lot, it is accountable government, and it refers all decisions to the common people. So I propose that we abandon monarchy and increase the power of the people, because everything depends on their numbers (III 80.2-6).

Otanes’ definition of ἰσονομία is built a) upon features associated with democracies in antiquity (italicized) and later endorsed by Herodotus in his own narrative voice through a direct allusion to the Persian debate (VI

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6 Further discussion and references: Sebastiani 2018a.
43.3), and b) against two κακότητες closely associated with tyranny (ὑβρίς and φθόνος).

Megabyzus comes next and dismisses democracy by relying on moral complaints against the people (III 81.1), reproaches with which Darius will agree from the start (III 82.1) and that are generically associated with κακότητες (III 82.3). Both Megabyzus and Darius limit themselves to criticizing democracy from its moral angle, without uttering a single word about its positive aspects suggested by Otanes in III 80.6. Besides, at the end of his speech Darius asks:

One point sums the whole thing up — where did we get our independence from and who gave it to us? Was it the people or an oligarchy or a monarch? My view, then, is that since we gained our freedom thanks to a single individual, we should keep to this way of doing things. And I would add that we should not abolish our ancestral customs (πατρίους νόμους), which serve us well (III 82.5).

Darius’ conclusions imply that isonomia, like monarchy and freedom as well, is also a gift to be given by someone to a collectivity — that is, to be proposed from above — , a perception that he and Otanes share. The next paragraph is still more revealing about the communion of interests deeply shared by both. As «four out of the seven endorsed Darius’ view» (III 83.1), Otanes gives up:

«My fellow conspirators», he said, «whether we choose by lot, or give the Persian people the chance to elect their preferred candidate, or use some other method, it will obviously be one of us who is to become king. Under these circumstances, I am not going to stand against you as a candidate; I have as little desire to be a ruler as I have to be ruled. However, I renounce my claim to the kingdom on one condition — that I and my descendants should never be ruled by any of you». The other six agreed to his idea, so he stood down and did not compete against them for the kingdom (III 83.2-3).

Otanes’ desire (italicized) is puzzling, to say the least: should it be taken as a sort of anarchist manifesto? And how does it impact Otanes’ very notion of ἰσονομίη? What kind of democracy would grant someone not being ruler nor ruled? Is his renunciation and wish to remain «unrulable» a mark of his alleged σοφροσύνη (a posture between caution and fear), or a token that, like Darius’, his chief interests were concentrated upon his own personal ends, in
the case his own ἐλευθερία? Sissa argues for a «“time sensitive” reading» whose chief strategy would be, following Solon’s advice, «[l]et us look at the end!» (2012, pp. 232-233; original italics). There are different ways to understand this suggestion and one of them is particularly intriguing. The end of this story is not, as she proposes, the end of the Histories, but the paragraph above and the «horse stratagem» (III 84-87) that follows immediately and grants Darius the kingship. Yet at the closure of Otanes’ participation in this story, was it with ἰσονομίη that he was rewarded, provided that his own house would be the only one in the kingdom to dispose of the same unrestricted freedom as the king’s? How should we understand the public-and-private peculiar condition he was granted with through the consensus of the other six Persians?

If we answer «yes» to the first question, then it follows that ἰσονομίη might mean something more loosely connected with democracy, like a precondition for freedom to be seemingly reached out even in private circumstances (ἡ οἰκίη - III 83.3) and dependent on someone else’s agreement (συνεχώρεον οἱ ἔξ ἐπὶ τούτοισι - III 83.2). Perhaps it might somehow be enforced by a broader collective agreement so as to give rise to a democracy too. But if we answer «no», then there is room for democracy and ἰσονομίη be more tightly connected, if not conveying the same phenomenon. Yet such an answer would have a heavy negative implication: Otanes would thus enact an opportunist player far more unscrupulous than Darius, in addition to being deeply incoherent. ἰσονομίη would serve as a simple means to his own private goals which, in the end, are contemplated either way. And as cognitive metaphors, Darius’ behavior and his would be equivalent: the same self-centered opportunism Darius relied on from the start is what granted him the Persian kingship, while Otanes’ prudence and moderation, or even fear (as implied by his σωφροσύνη), would actually be just a mere varnish to hypocrisy.

Ethical qualifications are central to distinguish isonomia from the background of vices associated with tyranny. Otanes’ attitudes impact how we ought to understand isonomia in light of the attitudes enacted by its proponent and critic as well. This explains why, in Persian eyes at least, Darius’ appeal to a monarchy would be in accordance with, and positively appreciated by, Persian πάτριοι νόμοι, being ἰσονομίη a mistake or a political paradox for them.

7 On a fundamental dichotomy structuring Otanes’ speech as isonomia (democracy) vs. tyranny, a thesis we are relying on here, see Musti 2018, pp. 54-56.
Up until this point we have already the chief elements that allow us to define the cognitive metaphors clustering around *isonomia*. Otanes’ attachment to truth-seeking goes hand in hand with a changing and adaptive attitude, thus framing *isonomia* as byproduct of the conjunction of veracity and versatility. These metaphors also bring forth, however, two other elements that concur to form Herodotus’ view of *isonomia*: it was proposed from above, from a powerful man to his fellows, not amid debates with the Persian people; and the privilege Otanes was awarded with at the closure of his participation in the scene points to an anarchic rather than democratic bias in his proposition. These two elements make *isonomia* share with forms of autocracy of two of their most distinguished features. With Cleisthenes, however, a significant change occurs. In the next section, the same cognitive metaphors will be seen associated with him but in a distinct way—predominantly through its ethical aspects.

3. **Cleisthenes and demokratia**

Around the cognitive metaphors associated with Otanes we see clustering respectively truth-seeking and adaptability. But when we contrast *isonomia* and *demokratia* in Herodotus’ text, to these clusters two other fundamental elements shall be added: the emptiness or renunciation (ὑπεξίσταμαι in Otanes’ words) implied by *isonomia*, and activity implied by democracy. These stances form the core around which the ethical metaphors respectively associated with *isonomia* and *demokratia* are organized. Accordingly, this section will focus on Cleisthenes’ activities and the ethics that guided his steps, so as to make clear how both were intrinsically dependent on his material background and communication abilities as well.

In a dispute with Isagoras about ascendancy over the Athenians, Cleisthenes took a path distinct from that which half-century ago a then would-be Athenian tyrant, Peisistratus, had successfully taken (I 59.4-5, I 60.3): instead of deceiving the people, though, he made himself close to them, even if as a secondary choice.

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* For the concept of «framing device» see Baragwanath & De Bakker 2012, p. 40; Thomas 2018, p. 266.

* On the decisive role played by the Athenian people in 508/7 against the threat of tyranny posed by Isagoras and the Spartans, as well as the role of Cleisthenes—not as their leader but as an innovator—, see Ober 1989, pp. 68-69; Ober 1996, pp. 33-51; De Ste. Croix 2004,
There were two particularly powerful men in Athens: Cleisthenes, who was an Alcmaeonid (and was the one, reputedly, who bribed the Pythia), and Isagoras the son of Tisander, who came from a distinguished house, but one whose origins I have been unable to discover. (However, relatives of his offer sacrifices to Carian Zeus.) Now, a power struggle took place between these two men, which Cleisthenes lost. He then allied himself with the common people and instituted the system of ten tribes in Athens, when there had been only four before (V 66.1-2).

So when he had won over to his side the ordinary people of Athens, who had previously been discounted, he changed the names of the tribes and increased their number. He created ten tribal leaders, then, where there had formerly been four, and divided the whole population between these ten tribes. And once he had won the ordinary people over, he was far more powerful than his political opponents (V 69.2).

The man whom Herodotus ascribes the foundation of democracy at Athens (VI 131.1) takes the step Otanes was not able to take, or did not want to. Cleisthenes’ strategy shows common points with both Darius’ and Otanes’. Like both, Cleisthenes firstly disputes to prevail — up until then the people had not yet been taken into consideration —. Once failed, though, Cleisthenes acts boldly, making himself a friend (προσεταιρίζεται) to the people, an ambivalent strategy, now similar to Darius’ (who was supported by the remaining five Persians) and also opposite to Otanes’, who preferred to anxiously seclude himself from the political arena. Like Darius and even Peisistratus, Cleisthenes did not renounce, but occupied, public spaces in embracing the demands of the Athenian people. Differently from them, though — and this point is central —, Cleisthenes parcels out the power thus achieved, adapting himself to the newborn situation.

Cleisthenes’ attitudes share «taxonomic relations of similarities» with the ethical metaphors associated with isonomia, so that these very same attitudes help us better understand why isonomia is at the same time fundamentally distinct from, and complementary to, democracy. In addition to the occurrence in Otanes’ mouth, in the practical sphere, isonomia appears in Herodotus’ Histories as a state of affairs resulting from the condescension of for-
mer tyrants, not as the expression of popular demands to be embraced by a powerful ally:

I did not like the way Polycrates was the master of people who were, after all, no different from himself, and I would not condone such behaviour from anyone else either. Anyway, Polycrates has met his fate. For my part, I put power in the hands of all in common and proclaim a state of equality before the law (ἰσονομίην). The only privileges I claim for myself are that six talents from Polycrates’ fortune be set aside for me, and I would also like to reserve for myself and my descendants the priesthood of Zeus the Liberator (III 142.3-4)
The first thing he [Aristagoras] did was relinquish his position as tyrant and convert Miletus to a theoretical state of equality before the law (ἰσονομίην), so that the citizens of Miletus would voluntarily join in the rebellion. He then proceeded to do the same throughout Ionia (V 37.2)

The first passage correlates *isonomia* with the disruption of a situation where someone acts as a δεσπότης above his equals, then resigns power but asking something in return for it as a compensation for the future lost authority —like Otanes’ speech suggests—. From the second passage, it is evident the central role played by renunciation for *isonomia* to come true. «Equality before the law» essentially means absence of political dissymmetries caused by the renunciation enacted by a tyrant —that is, the resulting state derived from a simplification, i.e. the extinction of the only destabilizing political agent in a community—. This renunciation of the public space implies that everyone within this space remains theoretically equal before each other, in a way that bare space is free to be occupied by whatever form of power —or even the total absence of it, like anarchy— ranging from the broadest democracy to a strict individualistic autocracy (as Otanes’ «unrulable» condition turned out to be). Democracy, on the other hand, implies an active role on the part of a demos who intentionally occupies public spaces, thus controlling their own decisions and their enforcement, that is, courageously accepting the nuanced complexity of a new socio-political reality. This sort of return to a hypothetical original state of things that *isonomia* conveys seems reinforced in Herodotus by its very absence when the historian needs to qualify the new situation in Athens after Cleisthenes’ reforms —that is, when democracy is operationalized—:

So Athens flourished. Now, the advantages of everyone having a voice (ἰσηγορίη) in the political procedure are not restricted just to single instanc-
es, but are plain to see wherever one looks. For instance, while the Athenians were ruled by tyrants, they were no better at warfare than any of their neighbours, but once they had got rid of the tyrants they became vastly superior (V 78.1)

This new state of things is called isegorie. Like democracy, isegorie also implies political activity, a state perfectly fit for a new reality in a city where democracy was built upon its chief fundament, isonomia. Again, like Darius and Peisistratus before him, Cleisthenes also enacts a trajectory marked by activities whose aim is precisely the consecution of an original intention. Differently from them, though, Cleisthenes’ initiatives turn out as a collective sharing of powers, not as autocracy. Otanes, on the other hand, envisages a possibility —the establishment of a non-hierarchized state of affairs or even the return to a supposed previous state like this— but actually ends up achieving exclusively for himself, in a somehow self-centered awkward way, this very same state. Cleisthenes, taking a step forward, extends political participation to the fellows who fought beside him against Isagoras and the Spartans. Otanes was not able to attract the Persian people to his own cause because he addressed to his six comrades only, not to the people directly, as Peisistratus and Cleisthenes did. Moreover, Otanes did not propose a structural change of Persian society as Cleisthenes did in Athens, limiting his action to the suggestion of a non-government. And once again we can add another element of similarity to the cognitive metaphors that differentiates isonomia from demokratia: the former is the byproduct of attitudes like the dissolution of autocracies, and from that moment on it simply remains a fundamental basis for whatever else political state of affairs, among them even democracies. The latter presupposes active engagement in a collective construction.

In a way quite similar to Darius’ and Peisistratus’, who initially sidelined the people to achieve their intents, Cleisthenes also sidelined his own opponents —the men around Isagoras. Strategic thinking obviously integrates also the cognitive and ethical metaphors associated with Athenian democracy and autocracy. Deceiving, cunning, and a conscious manipulation of truth and lies, though, are constituents exclusively associated with the latter —notice their absence along Cleisthenes’ digression—. But initiatives like these can be enforced only because rooted in a terrain with plenty of possibilities. A material element unite at least three of the four men so far focused —Otanes,
Darius, and Cleisthenes: they were wealthy, if not the wealthiest in their contexts—. Such economic dimension behind all the initiatives put into practice by these men forms the necessary background to government changes and the implementation of new political systems. Being rich, in other words, forms the non-sense, a non-mentioned or almost veiled dimension, the necessary condition for the production of sense, out of which initiatives like the ones examined can arise. Political activities like democracy and autocracy presuppose a background of social capabilities —isonomia and available material resources— to be performed. The difference, however, consists in that while the former concentrates these resources and means in one single individual, the latter is made by a continuous effort to make them collectively and equitatively available. Two of these resources, economic and communication power, form the object of the next section.

4. Democracy, economy, and communication

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to detail how a democracy functions, so we will focus on two aspects just signaled by Herodotus, but which are key to contemporary democracies too: economics and communication. The second cluster of metaphors —pragmatic— comprehends the means and possibilities each character (Otanes and Cleisthenes) had to enforce their original proposition. Both came from wealthy families and were able to constitute vast networks of influence. Herodotus plainly qualifies Otanes at his entrance in the main narrative: «[o]ne of the noblest and wealthiest Persians was a man called Otanes, whose father was Pharnaspes» (III 68.1). Cleisthenes was an offspring of the prestigious Alcmaeonids (VI 126-131) and grandson of the homonymous tyrant of Sicyon (V 66-67)\(^\text{10}\). Both men had at their disposition plenty of material resources to help them getting closer to the people through persuasion, as Cleisthenes did, but not Otanes. Consequently, the results of their respective political strifes become almost predictable: by relying on his six comrades only, without directly addressing the Persian people, Otanes is defeated. By taking a different path, Cleisthenes succeeded. Democracy thus turned out to be a project built up together with the demos who would directly

\(^{10}\) A supplementary information about Cleisthenes’ economic power is provided by Isocrates (\textit{Antid.}, 232).
benefit from it. *Isonomia*, on the other hand, despite eventually genuinely conceived by Otanes as collective construction, leaves the impression of being just a means to preserve and augment his own original power through levelling down that of his rivals. In a certain sense both succeeded, Otanes remaining untouchable together with his family, Cleisthenes paving the road for a century of democracy in Athens amid strong Alcmaeonid influence. Most important, in Cleisthenes’ case there is no say about a democracy hijacked by economic power; on the contrary, this is the predictable outcome of a democracy enacted together with their direct beneficiaries. Even *isonomia* brings within itself the possibility of being collectively discussed and/or implemented, as shows the expression ἐς μέσον, also key to democracy.

Herodotus’ very words vouchsafe that perception. Ὀτάνης μὲν ἐκέλευε ἐς μέσον Πέρσῃσι καταθεῖναι τὰ πρήγματα (III 80.2). In Cleisthenes’ case, the collective enactment of democracy becomes patent: ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δήμον προσεταιρίζεται (V 66.2), πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσθήκατο [scil. δήμον] (V 69.2), ἢν τε τὸν δήμον προσθέμενος πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων (V 69.2) —notice Herodotus’ fifth-century vocabulary alluding to a *hetaireia*11, used as explanation of Cleisthenes’ triumphing over his opponents (πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων).

Those distinct stances can be subsumed in two practical issues implied by both *isonomia* and *demokratia*. Otanes’ proposition, if implemented, would have to extend through the vastness of the Persian empire. Besides, in his speech he does not mention how to do it, or by means of which institutions *isonomia* could be effectively put into practice. His proposal has a strong utopian flavour not because it contradicts what Darius called *patrioi nomoi*, but because in the end it looks unfeasible to the other six Persians, who therefore refused it. Cleisthenes, on the other hand, orchestrated a new regime within very narrow geographic limits through an immediate reorganization of Athenian society12. Be-

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sides, his act just put into practice something that was already implied in Athenian political traditions since Solon and Peisistratus but in a broader way: the gradual sharing of power with an ever larger number of citizens. Moreover, Cleisthenes’ solution helped Athenians ward off a concrete and tangible threat, the possibility of Isagoras recovering tyranny with the help of a foreign power, Sparta, while Otanes’ seemed dangerous —risk of mob rule, tyranny of the majority, or alleged excesses— at least to Darius and Megabyzus.

The decisive roles played by economic power in both ancient and contemporary democracies present deep analogies, notwithstanding the structural differences between direct and representative systems. In theory at least, relative economic equality at Athens was a precondition to democracy (Patriquin 2015). Mounk’s meditation, however upon the same issue but in contemporary democracies, would perfectly fit a discussion about its semantic equivalent in ancient democracies with but minor changes:

As long as money can easily buy power, many citizens understandably feel that political equality remains an empty promise. And as long as economic necessity radically constrains the kinds of choices they can make, many citizens understandably feel that the freedom they were promised has not materialized. To live up to the most exalted claims of its adherents, liberal democracy needs to be embedded in a broader context of social and economic justice—and make citizens feel that they actually hold power (2018, p. 157).

Ancient democracies would not be possible without the perspective of an eventual economic democracy. It was precisely why Otanes’ isonomia remained just an utopia, never becoming a real polity unless to the only man able to pragmatically enforce it —Otanes himself. Such aspiration to economic equality, as well as economic power, functions as a background of non-sense13 in Herodotus’ narrative, however not directly linked to the democracy issue so far discussed. Economic power is precisely what allows each character to enact or not their original intentions, while aspirations to equality are the main driver of people’s choices. Neither Otanes’ intentions nor his eventual aspirations were enough to counter the combined power of his other six companions, yet they perfectly suit his final choice. Cleisthenes,
on the other hand, could implement democracy only because he was able to associate his own personal wealth and skills with Athenian people’s aspirations against tyranny.

In such context, communicating and persuading are direct consequences of economic power. The ability to catch attention and gain momentum—or not to, as in Otanes’ case—is intrinsically linked to the strategies both Otanes and Cleisthenes were able to develop. As stated before, Otanes spoke exclusively to his six Persian comrades, what significantly narrowed possibilities and scope of isonomia to be converted into a plausible polity. Without the people who would directly benefit from it—a people difficult to reach out because of the extension of Persia—, isonomia remained just a quasi-utopia. Cleisthenes, on the other hand, is shown actively getting closer to the Athenian people and seemingly persuading it to join efforts against a common enemy.

The main trait that intertwines both Otanes’ and Cleisthenes’ initiatives and contemporary democracies is the promptness and effectiveness with which communication is established between proposers and receivers. Otanes, of course, addresses a very restrict circle of noblemen and has an immediate response. But also Cleisthenes seems to have done something quite similar. He also addressed a close circle of Athenians with a common enemy—τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον—and in about four years his reforms were totally enacted (Ober 1996, p. 37).

The hallmark that seemingly contributed a lot to the effectiveness of Cleisthenes’ activity in comparison to Otanes’ failure can be summarized, from a communication standpoint, as a strategy remarkably similar to three of the «communication networks» described by O’Connor & Weatherall (2019): wheel, complete, and star:\(^\text{14}\):

\begin{itemize}
    \item In a network with uniform beliefs, if a central individual changes belief, that person exerts strong conformist influence on peripheral individuals, who will
\end{itemize}

\(^{14}\) Images available at O’Connor & Weatherall 2019, pp. 56-57. In the first network (wheel), nodes are interconnected to each other as in a circle having also a central one, the only one connected to all of them at the same time. In the second (complete), all nodes are interconnected to each other at the same time, thus dispensing with the central node. In the third, the central node is connected to all others, but there are no other connexions between them besides the central one.
likely also change their beliefs. Targeting influential people to spread a new practice or belief is just one way propagandists take advantage of our conformist tendencies (p. 143).

To persuade a group to change beliefs, you need to find someone who shares their other core beliefs and values, and get that person to advocate your view (p. 178).

These models were conceived to discuss interactions between policy makers, scientists, and propagandists, interactions through which beliefs are produced, shared, and modified. These models not only illustrate how communication comes about in contemporary democracies especially when performed through social media\textsuperscript{15}. Rather, they are also particularly apt to describe how Cleisthenes quite probably availed himself of to get closer to the Athenian demos—his immediate receivers—and enact together with them the innovations they were eager for. Cleisthenes can thus be described as the «central individual», the «influential person», or the one «who shares their other core beliefs and values», the chief of which might likewise be the aspiration to economic equality\textsuperscript{16}. As economic factors, the effectiveness of his communication with the Athenian people was also a decisive factor responsible for his fate opposite to Otanes’. And such effectiveness precisely points out to the element that makes demokratia share with isonomia the same core cognitive metaphor, truth-seeking: had Cleisthenes not been truthful to his Athenian countrymen, his reforms would not have been enacted nor endured for so long. As in a circle, cognition impacts ethics according to economic backgrounds which in turn promotes communication, the basis of which are either truths or lies.

5. Concluding remarks

One general takeaway from this exam is that resorting to metaphors as categorical classification allows us differentiate isonomia from demokratia in

\textsuperscript{15} On contemporary democracies getting more direct every day due to internet interactions, their potentialities and threats, and the constraints these phenomena impose, see Romano 2013, pp. 65-73, Johnson & Gluck 2016, Cassese 2017, pp. 135-145, Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, Mounk 2018, pp. 198-217, and Hendricks & Vestergaards 2019.

seeing them as target entities constituted by a wide network of sense-making processes. Truth-seeking, renunciation to the public space and adaptability to the outcome, amplitude of application, a certain utopic feature, difficulties in being communicated, and some anxiety to simplify reality complexities are the key metaphors with which Herodotus enacts his isonomia. And he makes in turn demokratia share with it the same truth-seeking core, but now implying occupation of the public space, limitation of its applicability, swift communication, and courageous collective engagement to complex public affairs sometimes in a Darius-like way—a fundamental flaw that can turn any democracy susceptible to give rise to forms of tyranny, either individual or collective.

Fundamental compliance with truth, on the one hand, as well as manipulation of both truth and lies, on the other, have consequential behaviors which imply—or not—a centrifugal use of economic and communication resources, then respectively collective sharing of power or its concentration (in case of success). Noticing how these networks of sense-making go along each other is key to understand how Herodotus narrativity can still help us bridge gaps between antiquity and contemporaneity, as well as improve our own democratic deliberation. Truth-issues are forcefully democracy-issues, words are not simply words, but means to power with profound implications in anyone else’s lives. At the center of the cognitive metaphors so far evinced, and consequently fundamental also to the pragmatic stances that stem from them, are beliefs whose forge and transmission form our very living in the world. The ways we deal with beliefs show whether we recognize their sometimes paradoxical complexities or use them as tools to quickly simplify and reduce the world to our own private horizons, thus evading hard decisions (O’Connor & Weatherall 2019, p. 168).

Beliefs are at stake in the Persian debate, both concerning its historicity and the truthfulness of each speakers’ proposition. They are also key to understand the tricky behaviour the historian attributes to Darius throughout book III, the contradictions implied in Otanes’ attitude at the end of the scene, and the steps taken by Cleisthenes in V 69. For contemporary receivers to improve democracies, a fairly likely suggestion would be to try to permanently behave as an ancient ἵστωρ, hardly searching for factual truth and then forming beliefs out of its intricacies instead of the other way round, especially in an age of attention markets and the consequent wide-
spread misinformation derived from them. Gut feeling and wishful thinking, on the contrary, lead to the opposite direction, blatant populism or totalitarianism.

Second, the exam shows that the enactive approach is a promising tool for studying historiographic texts as Herodotus’ *Histories*, and not only fictional ones. Popova postulates that

> [i]n natural narratives or nonfictional discourse, the author of the discourse speaks in his or her own voice, while in fictional narratives, what is said is attributed to the speaking «voice» of the text itself and originates with the narrator, an entity that is separate from the actual author in most instances (2015, p. 63).

In Herodotus’ case, though, where characters have autonomous voices, being at the same time historical but embedded with fictional speeches and features, such a neat distinction is easily misleading. For our present purpose, most promising are her conclusions about how one is supposed to deal with metaphorical meaning: «[m]etaphorical meaning, on this view, would be understood as mutual co-achievement as a result of interacting in a particular context» (2015, p. 110). With no responsive receivers there is no co-achievements like narratives or democracies.

This analysis was intended to add arguments to a perception that other fields had already stated long ago, but that seems each day more important for any citizen conscious of their roles as agents responsible for their own acts. Another contemporary truism detects the immense power that material and communicational resources have behind and upon the constitution of democracies, to the point of impacting their foundations and management. But the fundamental question to be answered is what each of us can do to at least get a better trade-off from these overwhelming pressures. If we cannot postulate miraculous solutions to save our every day more threatened democracies, we can at least stay alert to the best metaphors we can make circulate so as to help improve them. For this, the selective combination of attributes from both *isonomia* and *demokratia* promoted by Herodotus, as well as a permanent interplay between ancient democracies and their

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contemporary analogous systems, still seem a promising spring. This past-oriented exam can constitute a safe fact-checking tool, via analogies with past contexts, to validate contemporary information with the benefit of extended hindsight and far less interference from cognitive bubbles and biases. Far from being a naive re-enactment of the aged *historia magistra uitae*, we merely suggest the metaphors so far discussed as bridges between Herodotus’ narrativity and democratic deliberations to come. Questions about justice or checks-and-balances, for example, even if absent from the texts so far examined, are also perfectly traceable in the main narrative as sources of metaphors.

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