THREE CATULLAN EMENDATIONS*

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TRES NOTAS CRÍTICAS A CATULO

A critical discussion of the text of three passages of Catullus (36.9; 51.8; 62.15), the last of which has rarely been suspected by scholars. Previous conjectures are discussed before new emendations are offered.

Keywords: Catullus; textual criticism; emendation.

Se hace un análisis crítico del texto de tres pasajes de Catulo (36.9; 51.8; 62.15), el último de los cuales pocas veces ha sido puesto en duda por los estudiosos. Se discuten las conjeturas previas antes de ofrecer nuevas propuestas.

Keywords: Catulo; crítica textual; conjetura.

36.1-10:
Annales Volusi, cacata charta,
uotum soluite pro mea puella.
nam sanctae Veneri Cupidinisque
uouit, si sibi restitutus essem
desissemque truces uibrare iambos,
electissima pessimi poetae
scripta tardipedi deo daturam
infelicibus ustulanda lignis.
et hoc pessima se puella uidunt
iocose lepide uouere diuis.


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1 iocosis was conjectured by A. Palmer, «Ellis’ Catullus», Hermathena 3, 1879, pp. 292-363, at p. 328; editors therefore do him an injustice in attributing the conjecture to A. Riese, who offered it independently five years later (Die Gedichte des Catullus, Leipzig, 1884, at p. 71).
Catullus’ girlfriend (whom I take with most scholars to be Lesbia) has vowed to Venus and Cupid that she will burn the electissima pessimi poetae / scripta (6-7), by which she means certain poems from the hand of Catullus, if he returns to her and ceases to write poetry that is offensive (presumably against her, as exemplified by poem 37). Catullus’ jest in return is purposefully to misinterpret Lesbia’s words and to burn instead some sheets of Volusius’ Annales (a work likewise derided at 95.7-8), what he takes to be «the choicest writings of the worst poet». Although it is the text of line 10 that has more often been suspected\(^2\), I here follow in the footsteps of the few scholars that have sensed a problem at the close of line 9 alone\(^3\). Although the supposedly comprehensive commentary of Thomson\(^4\) contains no discussion of the verse, uidit presents an obvious difficulty: it cannot be taken literally (‘saw’) but must bear the force of intellexit ‘realised’ (the tense being preterite, like uouit in 4); yet it is wholly inappropriate (and an apparent untruth) for Catullus to say that the girl «realised that this was a witty and charming vow»\(^5\). It is Catullus’ inversion of pessimus poeta that introduces the true wit. There have been two responses to this obstacle, either emending uidit to another verb or changing the et that opens the verse to its negative counterpart nec. Heyworth\(^6\) took the latter option and offered two suggestions, either retaining hoc (sc. uotum) as the object of uouere or altering it, after

\(^2\) It may not be necessary to alter the transmitted iocose and lepide, adverbs which are bound in asyndeton in the Catullian manner (cf. 32.10 and 46.11); C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus: A Commentary*, Oxford, 1973, ad loc., is therefore right to say that «the asyndeton cannot be regarded as impossible». Nonetheless, it is quite possible that a connective particle has been lost, and Goolf’s ac is a more Catullan supplement than the Renaissance et. It is worth noting, however, that E. Baehrens, *Analecta Catulliana*, Jena, 1874, at p. 15, paraphrased this passage thus: «Lesbia igitur, si Catullus sibi restitutus esset, tum uero pessimi poetae scripta pessima Uolcano se daturum uouerat. quod sane iocose ac lepide uouerat».

\(^3\) I follow the majority of critics who take pessima as feminine (cf. the similarly jocular use of pessimae puellae at 55.10), as the word order of the Latin naturally suggests.


\(^5\) The comment upon the word by K. Quinn, *Catullus: The Poems*, London, 1973\(^2\), ad loc., that «the tense implies she may have changed her mind», is irrelevant, for either way uidit imports the unwarranted sense of past «realisation» for Lesbia.

Housman\(^7\), to *uos* (= *carta Annalium Volusii*). Diggle\(^8\), however, has rightly objected to both of these conjectures: the first (*nec hoc*) removes from Lesbia any credit for her joke and instead shifts the wit entirely onto Catullus; the latter (*nec uos*), Heyworth’s preferred conjecture, inappropriately implies that Lesbia was mistaken about what part of the joke was *iocosum* and *lepidum* and renders Catullus’ mode of expression unnecessarily convoluted.

If instead the transmitted *et hoc* is retained, Diggle has correctly pointed out that the required sense for the main verb of the sentence is ‘thought’ or ‘supposed’: the girl (wrongly) supposed that her actions were made *iocos lepide*. His own suggestion, *credit*, introduces the required semantics but also a problematic shift to the present tense, which comes as a surprise\(^9\). Diggle suggests that the present tense conveys the fact that the girl’s belief still continues into the present. Yet it is hard to believe that this is the case when Catullus has now turned her words around in order to burn the work of Volusius, presumably in a mock ceremony carried out by both of the reunited pair\(^10\). In lieu of his *credit* I conjecture what I believe to be the only suitable verb that is metrically possible in the required past tense: *duxit* ‘supposed’, ‘believed’\(^11\). The verb is well attested in the sense of subjective (often mistaken) supposition among authors of the period\(^12\); Catullus himself writes *perditum ducas* at 8.2 («regard as lost») and *tu satis id duxti* at 91.9 («you supposed that this was enough»). Since *duxit* contains four of the five letters of *uidit*, corruption

\(^7\) Housman’s own *et uos* (taking *pessima* as a neuter vocative plural) can be dismissed from the outset, since it wrongly demands that Lesbia realised that her vow meant the destruction of Volusius’ not Catullus’ work.

\(^8\) J. Diggle, «On the text of Catullus», *MD* 57, 2006, pp. 85-104, in his discussion of this passage at pp. 88-90, has shown that numerous translators have wishfully taken *uidit* as if it meant ‘saw as’ or ‘supposed to be’.

\(^9\) Indeed *credit*, taken with Catullus’ loose use of the present infinitive *uouere* in 10, would deprive the sentence of any reference to the past at all.

\(^10\) Nettleship’s *ludit*, a conjecture presumably inspired more by the *ductus litterarum* than a purposeful wish to introduce the present tense, suffers from this same problem.

\(^11\) Of course, H. Comfort’s *dicit* could be adapted to *dixit* (a suggestion which one of the anonymous reviewers has approved), but the resultant sense would be undoubtedly weak as well as improbable: we would not expect Lesbia to have declared the actual wittiness of her amorous vow to Catullus or any other.

\(^12\) E. g., Cic., *Q. Rosc.* 6; *Verr.* II 1.123; 4.72; *Cluent.* 12; *Att.* II 17.5; *Fam.* IV 7.1; Caes., *Gall.* I 3.2; IV 30.2; Sall., *Iug.* 93.5; Nep., *Alc.* 7.1; Prop. III 7.44; IV 11.92; Liv. VII 18.3; X 11.12; XXII 14.6 etc.
to the latter (commoner) verb in a single step would have been entirely possible. Lesbia’s belief in the wittiness of her actions proved to be misplaced, since Catullus outsmarts her by his own witty reversal, as his words later in the poem effectively confirm: 16-17 acceptum face redditumque uotum, / si non illepidum neque inuenustum

51.1-9:

ILLE mi par esse deo uidetur, 
ille, si fas est, superare diuos, 
qui sedens aduersus identidem te 
spectat et audit 
dulce ridentem, misero quod omnes 
eripit sensus mihi: nam simul te, 
Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi

lingua sed torpet, ...

Although the adonean closing Catullus’ second stanza does not survive in our manuscripts, the corresponding part of Sappho’s Greek original (31 fr. Voigt) is preserved by ps.-Longinus (Subl. 10). Until the early decades of the 20th century, Sappho was generally supposed to have written in the corresponding verses (7-8) ὧς μὲ φῶνας / οὐδὲν ἐτ’ ἐικεῖ [as if = Attic ἐικεῖ]. Dan-
ielsson, Lobel, and Page, however, correctly rejected the transmitted φόνας (which had been taken as a partitive genitive) owing to the doubtful status of οὐδὲν φόνας as Greek and the inappropriate sense it conveys (implying as it does that no voice reaches, rather than leaves, Sappho)\(^{15}\). With Lobel’s simple, and now widely accepted, emendation to φόνησ’ (perhaps better supplied in its Aeolic form φόναισ’, as suggested by Danielsson and adopted by Page), an aorist infinitive is restored (suffering elision of its final syllable). If therefore we take εἰκει more naturally as an impersonal form of εἰκω, here serving a similar role to impersonal παρείκει (as at, e. g., Pl., Leg. 734b.2-3), we can translate Sappho’s original sentence thus: «for when I see you for a brief moment, it is no longer possible for me to say anything».

Notwithstanding this refinement of the Greek text, however, Catullan critics, somewhat surprisingly, have not returned with a critical eye to the textual supplement at 51.8. Instead, the partitive genitive uocis has continued to appear in editions, most typically with in ore following, a supplement attributed, either by general agreement or unthinking repetition, to Fr. Ritter\(^{16}\). Yet since Catullus’ poem, though not an exact translation, clearly shows his general concern to render Sappho’s words faithfully, I see no good reason why he would not have translated here the idea of «inability to speak», and therefore employed an infinitive dependent upon est, in the missing adon-ean.\(^{17}\) Over a decade ago, Thomson (Catullus: A Critical Edition, ad loc.) made the correct but curiously conservative observation, that «it is still pos-

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\(^{15}\) The two passages from Plutarch (Erot. 18, Demetr. 38) cited by R. Ellis, A Commentary on Catullus, Oxford, 1889\(^2\), ad loc., are not quotations of Sappho’s poem but merely summaries of the fact that she depicted the loss of the voice on sight of her beloved. They therefore have no real bearing on the emendation of the transmitted text.

\(^{16}\) As is correctly stated by Trappes-Lomax, Catullus: A Textual Reappraisal, ad loc., this emendation is clearly recorded in the second edition of Doering (Altona, 1834), who records it as a conjecture that he had previously made but since rejected. Riese, Die Gedichte des Catullus, however, attributed it ad loc. to «Ritter 1828»; yet the suggestion certainly does not occur in Ritter’s De Aristophanis Pluto, Bonn, 1828, and presumably still remains to be uncovered in its original location by modern scholars.

\(^{17}\) It seems an unnecessary improbability to suppose that the text of Sappho 31.7 had been corrupted to the partitive genitive by the time that Catullus composed his poem. The yet more extreme suggestion of J. B. Lidov, «The second stanza of Sappho 31», AJPh 114, 1993, pp. 503-535, at pp. 520-521, that Catullus left a gap in his composition because he could not understand the text, is beyond all bounds of plausibility. A variant of this theory had already been proposed by G. V. C. Pfeiffer, Symbolae Catullianae, Gotinga, 1834, at
sible that some scholar may suggest a new supplement, with an infinitive in C[atullus] corresponding to φώναζε’. Since I have found no such conjecture yet made, I hope now to set the ball rolling.

The immediate question is whether nihil should be taken as the accusative object of an infinitive or rather as an adverbial accusative. With the text transmitted in 7, the latter seems to me a more attractive option. I suggest the following: nihil est («it is in no way possible»)18 super mi («for me in addition [sc. to the initial act of seeing you]»19) fundere uocem («to emit a voice»). For this verb and object we can compare, e. g., Cat. 64.125; Verg., Aen. IV 621; XI 428; Cic., Tusc. III 42.5; Progn. fr 4.2. The notion of speaking could be rendered in various ways in 51.820 but singular uocem seems more suitable than uoces or uerba and demands a dactylic infinitive preceding it21. My proposed text now renders the idea clearly expressed by Sappho: on seeing the object of one’s passions, it is no longer possible to use another of the senses, that of speech: ὠς γὰρ ἐξ ἐνόο ψιθύρας, ὠς μὲ φώναξε’ / οὐδὲν ἔρι’ εἶκε(ς)22. The third Catullan stanza, like that of Sappho, further enumerates the collapse of the senses as a whole. Of course any suggestion on this passage necessarily remains apparatus-bound in serious critical editions.

p. 49, who suggested that Catullus never came to complete the poem and therefore did not add line 8.

18 For adverbial nihil / nil in Catullus, cf. 6.12; 15.16; 16.6; 30.2; 42.21; 64.148; 93.1; for impersonal est used with an infinitive in the sense of possibility, see OLD s. u. sum §9.

19 It is not entirely impossible that Catullus had sought to introduce some temporal aspect into super (e. g., «any longer [than the moment of seeing you]»), as in Sappho’s original adverb ἔρι.

20 fundere uoces / uerba, reddere uocem / uoces / uerba, mittere uocem / uoces / uerba, dicere quicquam / uerba, uerba referre, uerba / uoce profari, uerba ciere etc.

21 I prefer this line of thought to two others: (i) to take est super as superest (with most commentators) and insert an infinitive in 51.8 with nihil as its object: uoce referre or reddere uoce could mean «there remains nothing for me to say» but the idea of vocal inability is thereby lost and the implication that previous things had already been said is undesirable; (ii) to take nihil as the object of the infinitive and supply a dependent partitive genitive, at some considerable remove, at the close of the stanza: Palmer’s mittere uocis, a suggestion seemingly overlooked by editors, seems to be aiming at this but the distance between nihil and uocis is difficult and we again miss the notion of incapacity (nonetheless, fundere or the other verbs suggested in n. 20 are, I believe, preferable to mittere).

22 The same inability was echoed by Theocritus (of Simaetha on first seeing Delphis): Π 108 οὐδὲν τι φωνήσαι δύναμαι.
62.13-16:

non frustra meditantur, habent memorabile quod sit,
nec mirum, penitus quae tota mente laborant.
nos alio mentes, alio diuisimus aures,
iure igitur uincemur, amat uictoria curam.

15 diuisimus V : diuidamus sscr. G3 : dimisimus recc. quidam

So do the iuuenes call their attention back to the amoebean song contest that is about to get into full swing. The text of 62.15 has rarely been suspected and discussion of it has typically focused on whether the pair alio... alio... conveys directional contrast (‘to one place’... ‘to another’) or rather emphasis on a single place (‘elsewhere’... ‘elsewhere’). On the former interpretation, diuisimus is difficult; on the latter, however, it seems to be almost impossible to interpret. To take the first instance, the Latin would mean: «we have split our minds in one direction and our ears in another». Disregarding the oddness of expression (for neither the mentes nor the aures have been split themselves)\(^{23}\), this contrast could only have appropriate force if either the youths’ mentes or their aures are currently fixed on the present situation and the other have been disjointed from it and thus have their focus elsewhere. Yet verse 17 soon below (animos ... convertite) makes clear that the men’s minds have at any rate wandered elsewhere. Therefore, in order for this first interpretation to stand, the ears of the youths must at this point be attending to the present situation. Two difficulties must then be faced. Firstly, it seems odd Latin to employ alio... alio... when the latter element refers to the immediate circumstances (as if = alio/iilluc... huc...). Secondly, why would the youths’ leader say that their minds have wandered elsewhere but that their ears are still focused on the imminent task? The singing contest proper has not yet begun but rather they have merely seen the girls leap up and begin to rehearse their song to themselves\(^{24}\). I fail therefore to see the purpose of the youths’

\(^{23}\) The interpretation of A. Agnesini, *Il Carme 62 di Catullo*, Cesena, 2007, in his note ad loc. («A nostro parere l’espressione potrebbe indicare la divisione tra il corpo e la mente, cioè la mancanza di concentrazione») seems improbable, for one does not speak of the mind or any of the individual senses as separated from the body.

\(^{24}\) The fact that the girls are planning their song in thought rather than uiua uoce is depicted beyond doubt in verses 12 (aspicite, innuptae secum ut meditata requirunt) and 13-14 (cited above). The interpretation of J. Godwin, *Catullus: Poems 61-8*, Warminster, 1996, ad loc., therefore seems misconceived: «we have to imagine the young men hearing the girls practising
saying «we have let our minds wander but not our ears» when there is no obvious target for their aural attention. Rather, it seems that a stern rebuke is intended in order to set the young men on course for victory: although both mind and ears are necessary for the imminent contest, the youths, no doubt distracted by the preceding banquet and the general merriment, have turned their thoughts and their ears to matters other than the song at hand.

We must therefore follow the second option, in which *alio* is repeated with the same referent\(^\text{25}\). This interpretation was rightly taken by Turnebus, Baehrens\(^\text{26}\), Grebe, Kroll and Thomson among others. *alio* therefore plays a clearly emphatic role, denoting any matters other than the competitive situation about to begin. The repetition of *alio* (at root the masc./neut. dative singular of *alius*) with the same referent finds a close parallel in the last line of the following poem as transmitted (63.93), in which Attis offers the following demand to Cybele: *alios age incitatos, alios age rabidos*, where both instances of *alios* denote the same hypothetical victims\(^\text{27}\). The fact that both the mind and the ears have been turned away from the matter at hand seems supported by verse 17: *quare nunc animos saltem convirtite uestros*, where *saltem* is typically taken with *nunc*. If, however, natural Latin word order is followed, we could translate «therefore now turn your minds at any rate back», i. e. the youths must at least turn their thoughts back to the task of delivering their song or they stand no chance of victory\(^\text{28}\).

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\(^{25}\) Such verbal repetitions in the poem are rife: *Vesper* 1 (*bis*), *iam* 3 (*bis*) and 4 (*bis*), *exsiluere* 8 and 9, *meditata* 12 alongside *meditantur* 13, *complexu* ... *auellere* 21 and 22, *pepigerunt* 28, *multi* ... *multae* 42, *nulli* ... *nullae* 44, *numquam* 50 (*bis*), *iam iam* 52, *nulli 53* (*bis*), *multii 55* (*bis*), *dum 56* (*bis*), *pater* 60 and 61, *tertia pars ... pars ... tertia 63.

\(^{26}\) E. Baehrens, *Catulli Veronensis Liber Vol. II*, Leipzig, 1885, ad loc., did well to warn «caue ne interpreteris ‘in alia re mentes quam aures sunt occupatae’».

\(^{27}\) Another conspicuous parallel is Ter., *And*. 189: *nunc hic dies aliam uitam affert, alios mores postulat* (a line thought to be intelligible enough by Cicero, who quoted it at *Fam. XII* 25.5).

\(^{28}\) This possible reading seems to render less probable the otiose alteration by Trappes-Lomax, *Catullus: A Textual Reappraisal*, ad loc., of *saltem* to *tandem*. 
To return to 62.15, I see no way of rendering *diuisimus* on this second interpretation without forcing it to mean something that it does not. To translate literally: «we have split our minds elsewhere and we have split our ears elsewhere». Yet there is here no division taking place, either among the *mentes* and the *aures* themselves or, as I have argued, of the *mentes* from the *aures*. Commentators have been quick to point to a line of Virgil to provide a parallel for the use of *diuidere* with the mind, namely *Aen*. IV 285 (=VIII 20): *atque animum nunc huc celerem nunc diuidit illuc*. But this apparent parallel proves to be illusory, for Virgil is here referring specifically to the division of the verbal object, the *animus*, between various simultaneous thoughts: he [Aeneas] sends some of his panicking mind to one thought, some of it to another, *nunc huc... nunc illuc...* expressing the constant chopping and changing of his troubled mind. The «parallel» that is really sought is of *diuidere* used in the sense of *deuertere* or similar. Unsurprisingly, the corpus of extant Latin literature provides no evidence of such a sense.

It seems to me clear that a different verb is required. *dimisimus*, found in various recentiores and conjectured independently by Pleitner, does have the advantage of being removed by only one letter from the paradosis. Although *dimittere* cannot generally provide the appropriate sense of ‘diverted’ or ‘directed’, Pleitner compares Ou., *Met*. III 381 (*hic stupet, utque aciem partes dimittit in omnes*) and VIII 188 (*dixit et ignotas animum dimittit in artes*). Neither seems to me satisfactory: in the two passages the eyes and the mind respectively are divided between a plurality of directions (all parts of the environs; [various] unknown arts), thereby allowing *di-* to bear its appropriate separative force. In 62.15, by contrast, no notion of separation has

29 Commentators have rightly noted that this is presumably Virgil’s attempt to render the Homeric notion encapsulated in διόνυσα μεριμνάςεων (*Il*. I 189; VIII 167; XIII 455); a similar idea is found at Verg., *Aen*. IV 630; V 701-702; X 680; the expression is also imitated by Stat., *Ach*. I 200. Ovid’s *secta... mens* (*Rem*. 443) of a mind torn between two potential female lovers is also unsuitable for comparison.

30 Although F. W. Grebe, *Studia Catulliana*, Amsterdam, 1912, at p. 66, rightly comments that «aliaqui vertimus sententiae sufficit», he wrongly believes that *diuisimus* can stand.

31 The reading is found in the following mss —in parentheses is the numerical reference from Thomson’s table of manuscripts (*Catullus* cit., pp. 72-91)—: Voss. lat. O. 59 (40), Brix. A vii 7 (10), Vic. G. 2.8.12 (122), Wolf. 332 Gud. lat. (128), Voss. lat. O. 81 (42), Ambr. H 46 sup. (56), Hamb. 139.4 (38), Laud. lat. 78 (75), Marc. 12.81 (116), Marc. 12.153 (118), Chis. H. IV.221 (107), Vat. Pal. lat. 910 (103), Vat. lat. 1608 (108).
been found to be intelligible. I therefore believe that correction of the verb *diuisimus* requires the replacement of the inappropriate prefix *di-* (‘apart’) by *de-* (‘away’).

The text of 15 already contains the emphatic idea of focus on another place in *alio... alio*, so the verb desired is one of directing or turning. Catullus’ verb for such direction of the mind and its senses appears to be *derigere*: cf. 63.56 *cupit ipsa pupula ad te sibi derigere aciem*. The verb is used of directing the mind, ears and eyes by various writers of the first centuries B.C. and A.D. I therefore suggest that Catullus wrote *dereximus*: although the girls are rehearsing their song *tota mente*, the youths by contrast have «directed their minds elsewhere and their ears elsewhere»34. Any editor of a Classical text soon becomes aware that the forms *derigere* and *dirigere* are perpetually confused in Latin manuscripts, even in our great Virgilian codices35, and it is accordingly not a particularly difficult supposition that *direximus* suffered corruption to the much commoner *diuisimus*36.

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32 I do not find attractive the notion that each *alio* means ‘elsewhere’ but that the two refer to distinct other locations. This reading seems to ask too much of the Latin, i.e. that both adverbs be taken as referring to matters separate from the contest and that the separative force of *di-* lies between the mind and the ears, not between them and the present circumstances. The chorus leader would have no obvious reason to claim or object that the mind and the ears lie on other, distinct matters.


34 The exactly opposite expression can be found in Cicero’s demand for increased attention at *Sull*. 33: *erigite mentes auresque uestras*.

35 In the primary Virgilian mss forms of *dirigere* are found for *derigere* in the following places: *Aen*. I 401 (MR²); V 162 (M); VI 57 (mss); VI 195 (M); VII 497 (MF²); VII 523 (R); X 140 (M); X 401 (MF²); cf. O. Ribbeck, *Prolegomena critica ad P. Vergili Maronis Opera Maiora*, Leipzig, 1866, at pp. 400-401.

36 *deuertimus* is also possible but places too much focus on turning away from a situation rather than towards another; *demisimus*, by contrast, is impossible.