

A STUDY OF THE PSYCHIC TERM *νόος* IN THE GREEK LYRIC POETS (EXCLUDING PINDAR AND BACCHYLIDES)

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The psychic term *νόος* in the lyric poets, as in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns*, seems best described as a 'faculty capable of a number of psychological activities'. It functions as a seat of disposition, temperament, and character. Moral traits in particular are associated with it. *Νόος*, in others, especially reflects their true attitudes and thoughts. In this psychic entity an individual finds himself most authentically expressed.

I. INTRODUCTION

The psychological term *νόος* occupies a position of importance in early Greek literature. It occurs in 116 passages of Homer and the *Homeric Hymns*; it is found in 26 passages of Hesiod¹. *Νόος* is mentioned as well in a large number of passages in the Greek lyric poets. The present article will analyse these instances (excluding those in Pindar and Bacchylides, which will be treated separately). It will focus upon the range of meaning of *νόος* and the ways in which a person related to this psychic entity. Similarities with and differences from the usage of *νόος* found in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns* will be discussed. Distinctive features of *νόος* that appear in this lyric poetry will be highlighted.

Three aspects of this lyric poetry will be kept in mind in the analysis of *νόος* to follow. First, it is fragmentary in nature. This feature makes generalisations drawn about *νόος*, of necessity, tentative, even though they may be valid for the evidence we do possess. Second, it is composed in different metres. The choice of *νόος* rather than another psy-

¹ On *νόος* in these authors see S. M. Darcus, «A Person's Relation to *νόος* in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets», *Glotta* 58, 1980, pp. 33-44; S. D. Sullivan, «The Psychic Term *Noos* in Homer and the *Homeric Hymns*» (forthcoming) and «The Psychic Term *Noos* in the Poetry of Hesiod» (forthcoming) with bibliography on other studies of *νόος* in these authors.

chological term may well have been influenced by demands of metre. Once again this aspect will bear upon the generalisations we can draw about νόος. Third, these authors write in the language of poetry. The scope of meaning and usage of νόος may have been far different in the spoken language of their day and, then again, it may not. In this paper, therefore, we can validly speak of the range of meaning of νόος only within the specific context of the poems that have survived.

Before treating νόος in the lyric poets, we will offer a brief summary of its usage in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns*. This summary will allow us to clarify different features of νόος that may appear in these poets. The epic language, used by Homer and Hesiod, was one with a long history. These poets drew on a rich reservoir of poetry that had been repeated by bards for centuries. This poetry was formulaic in structure. It was written in a specific metre, dactylic hexameter. Both these features had a marked influence on the manner in which different psychic terms appeared within it. One point is particularly important: the psychological term νόος, like other such terms, had been a part of the Greek language for a very long time before it appeared in the lyric poetry we shall examine.

In Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns*, νόος has certain prominent features. It occurs only in the singular but in all four cases. Unlike other psychic entities, νόος in this early poetry shows no traces of a physical origin. When it is located, it is usually placed in the chest region (στήθεα), but once it is found in θυμός (*Od.* XIV 490) and, another time, in φρένες (*Il.* XVIII 419).

As with other psychic entities, the roles of agent and function are not sharply delineated in mentions of νόος. It can be the agent that thinks, feels, and wills and also the thoughts, feelings, and plans that are formed. It seems most appropriately described in this early literature as a «faculty capable of a range of psychological activity». This psychological activity is complex in nature, including aspects commonly separated in modern terminology, namely those that are intellectual, emotional, and volitional. Such aspects are still fused in the language of Homer and Hesiod. Although one or another of these aspects may appear to be prominent in certain passages, all may be present in any occurrence of νόος. In the case of νόος intellectual activity is prominent. Often it appears to be a form of «inner vision» in which νόος grasps the meaning or significance of a situation². But a wider range of intellectual

² See, e.g., *Il.* X 226, XV 461, XXIII 149; *Od.* VI 320, X 494, XIII 255; Hes., *Theog.* 537, *W. & D.* 373. For a discussion of this activity of νόος see Sullivan (note 1) with bibliography.

function seems also associated with νόος: pondering, devising, or deliberating³. It is connected quite often with μήτις and βουλή and appears with the verb βουλεύω⁴. Such passages suggest that νόος did not simply «see» within but may have considered alternatives and choices. Since it is unlikely that mental activities were sharply delineated in the time of Homer and before, it is not surprising to find a wide range of intellectual activity associated with this psychic term.

Sometimes this activity of νόος can be described as particularly emotional⁵. But this aspect of νόος does not appear to be a prominent one. Its volitional aspect, on the other hand, seems often important. This is especially true in the case of Zeus' νόος, which expresses his plans, wishes, and will⁶.

Within the person νόος has a significant role. It can be an active agent that strongly affects his behaviour⁷. It can also be acted upon either by the person himself or by outside forces or agents⁸. In several instances it appears as an entity «known» or «recognised» by others. As such, it seems to function prominently within a person as an entity revealing his true nature.

Νόος displays various qualities in the person. In some cases it suggests permanent aspects of someone. It can have a positive nature and be, for example, 'fearless', 'well-fitted', 'god-fearing', 'noble', or 'great'⁹. Or, it can be negative: 'evil', 'unbending', 'rather hasty', or 'shameless'¹⁰. But νόος also changes. Odysseus says that it does so with the «day» (*Od.* XVIII 136). Hesiod too relates a particular «day» to a relationship a person has with νόος: someone born on the twentieth day is «cautious in respect to νόος» (*W. & D.* 793). Νόος also appears to improve with age (*Il.* XXIII 590, 604). In other passages as well Homer speaks of νόος as being different in different situations¹¹. Hesiod likewise describes νόος in this way. That of Zeus, for example, is «variable» (*W. & D.* 483). Both authors also mention outside forces and agents

³ See, e.g., *Il.* I 132, I 363; *Od.* II 236, XVI 197.

⁴ See, e.g., *Il.* VII 447, XV 509; *Od.* V 23, XIII 305, XIX 326.

⁵ See, e.g., *Il.* IX 554, XIV 217; *Od.* VIII 78; *H.* XIX 41, XXVII 27; *Hes., Theog.* 122.

⁶ See, e.g., *Il.* VIII 143, XV 242; *Od.* V 103, XXIV 164; *H. Her.* 10; *Hes., Theog.* 1002, *W. & D.* 105, 483.

⁷ See, e.g., *Il.* XIV 162, XV 80; *Od.* II 92, XXIV 474; *H. Her.* 396.

⁸ See, e.g., *Il.* XIV 217, XV 52; *Od.* II 124, XIX 42; *H. Cer.* 37; *Hes., Theog.* 122, *W. & D.* 67.

⁹ See, e.g., *Il.* III 63, *Od.* XX 366, *Od.* VI 121, *Il.* XIII 732, *Hes., Theog.* 37.

¹⁰ See *Od.* XIII 229, XVIII 381; *Il.* XXIII 590; *Hes., W. & D.* 67.

¹¹ See, e.g., *Il.* IV 309, XXII 382, XXIV 367; *Od.* II 124.

that have the power to alter *vóos*, sometimes for the worse¹². The ways in which *vóos* is open to outside influences show that it, like other psychic entities, did not have fixed boundaries. It could be changed.

A person appears in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns* to identify closely with *vóos*. He remains distinct from this psychic entity but it frequently acts as a seat of his true thinking and feeling¹³. Sometimes he may keep what his *vóos* contains hidden from others, thus guarding his innermost thoughts¹⁴. Often in both Homer and Hesiod *vóos* gives evidence of what the temperament or character of someone was like. It frequently seems to express his essential nature¹⁵. He usually acts in harmony with *vóos*. Sometimes he may control it (e. g., *Od.* XIX 42) or he may need to be aware of negative forces that can affect it (anger, e. g., gain, wine, or love)¹⁶. The condition of *vóos* within seems of high importance, perhaps because a person identifies most closely with this psychic entity. All these passages show that the meaning of *vóos* in these early authors was in no way a narrow, intellectual one, but rather a broad and wide-ranging one¹⁷. By its nature *vóos* appears very much to illustrate who a person is.

In the examination of *vóos* in the lyric poets that will follow¹⁸, we will not discuss each passage in detail in the text but will list all occurrences in Appendix One. These occurrences will be divided into six Sections that will show the range of meaning of *vóos* and the relationship a person had with this psychic entity¹⁹. These Sections will not be

¹² See, e.g., *Il.* IX 554, XIV 217; *Od.* XIX 479; *H. Ven.* 36; Hes., *Theog.* 537, fr. 239,3.

¹³ See, e.g., *Il.* XX 25, XXII 185, XXIV 377; *Od.* II 92, XIII 255, XIX 42.

¹⁴ See *Il.* I 363, XVI 19; *Od.* XXIV 474; Hes., *W. & D.* 714; fr. 16.7.

¹⁵ See, e.g., *Il.* XVI 688, XXII 382; *Od.* I 3, XXI 285; *H. Her.* 10; Hes., *Theog.* 262, 1002, fr. 43 a 76.

¹⁶ See *Il.* IX 554, XIV 217; Hes., *Theog.* 122, *W. & D.* 323, fr. 239,3.

¹⁷ For further discussion of this broad meaning of *vóos* in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns*, see Sullivan (note 1).

¹⁸ On the meaning of *vóos* in the lyric poets see the following: E. Lobel, *ΑΚΑΙΟΙ ΜΕΛΗ*, Oxford 1927, p. XXXVI; R. Schottländer, «Nus als Terminus», *Hermes* 64, 1920, pp. 228-239; M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik*, Munich 1955, *Zetemata* 12, pp. 195-203; D. J. Furley, «The Early History of the Concept of the Soul», *BICS* 3, 1956, pp. 5-10; V. N. Jarcho, «Zum Menschenbild der nachhomerischen Dichtung», *Philologus* 112, 1968, pp. 166-172; S. M. Darcus, «Noos Precedes Phren in Greek Lyric Poetry», *AC* 46, 1977, pp. 41-51; Darcus (note 1), pp. 39-44; G. Luck, «Der Mensch in der frühgriechischen Elegie» in *Gnomosyne, Festschrift Marg*, Munich 1981, pp. 167-176; S. D. Sullivan, «Noos and Vision: Five Passages in the Greek Lyric Poets», forthcoming in *SO* 63, 1988, pp. 5-15.

¹⁹ Fragments of the different poets are numbered according to the following editions: *Poetae Melici Graeci*, ed. D. L. Page, Oxford 1962; *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis*, ed. D. L. Page, Oxford 1974 = (S.); *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, ed. M. L. West, Oxford 1971, 2 vols. = (W.); *Sappho et Alcaeus, Fragmenta*, ed. E.-M. Voigt,

determined by case, although a Section and case may correspond. The syntax of the different passages will not be discussed but it too can be found in Appendix One for each occurrence. Within the six Sections, poets will generally be treated in chronological order except for very similar usages of *vóos*. For each instance we will suggest aspects of *vóos* that may be prominent. (These will be indicated in Appendix One by «I» for intellectual, «E» for emotional, «V» for volitional, and «M» for moral.) In Appendix Two we will list all descriptive adjectives appearing with *vóos*²⁰. To this analysis of *vóos* in the lyric poets we will now turn.

II. THE PASSAGES

Section A. vóos as Present, Active, or «Known» in a Person.

Of the 82 instances of *vóos* in the lyric poets, 29 fall into this Section. In the occurrences where *vóos* is present, active, or acted upon in the person, it appears in the nominative case. In the instances where it occurs as an entity «known», it is found in the accusative. In one passage, Solon says: «in every way the *vóos* of the immortals is hidden from men» (17 W.). Here *vóos* appears to signify the thoughts, plans, and will of the gods²¹. Hesiod speaks of the *vóos* of Zeus as one «hid-

Amsterdam 1971; *Epigrammata Graeca*, ed. D. L. Page, Oxford 1975 = (P.); Cross-references are also given in App. One to *Poetarum Elegiacorum Testimonia et Fragmenta*, ed B. Gentili and C. Prato, Leipzig 1979, 1985, 2 vols. = (G.-P.).

²⁰ Works consulted for this article include the following: A. W. H. Adkins, *Poetic Craft in the Early Greek Elegists*, Chicago 1985; A. P. Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, Cambridge, Mass., 1983; D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry, A Selection*, London 1967; *Greek Lyric*, I, Cambridge, Mass., 1982; *The Golden Lyre: The Themes of the Greek Lyric Poets*, London 1983; J. Defradas, *Les élégiaques grecs*, Paris 1962; R. L. Fowler, *The nature of Early Greek Lyric: Three Preliminary Studies*, Toronto 1987; H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, Munich 1962; A. Garzya, *Teognide, Elegie, Libri I-II*, Florence 1958; D. E. Gerber, *Euterpe: An Anthology of Early Greek Lyric, Elegiac, and Iambic Poetry*, Amsterdam 1970; B. van Groningen, *Theognis, le premier livre*, Amsterdam 1966; T. Hudson-Williams, *Early Greek Elegy*, London 1926; G. M. Kirkwood, *Early Greek Monody*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1974; D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, Oxford 1955; *Further Greek Epigrams*, Cambridge 1981; A. J. Podlecki, *The Early Greek Poets and their Times*, Vancouver 1984; H. D. Rankin, *Archilochus of Paros*, Park Ridge, N. J., 1977; R. Renehan, «The Early Greek Poets: Some Interpretations», *HSCP* 87, 1983, pp. 1-29; J. Tarditi, *Archiloco*, Rome 1968; M. Vetta, *Teognide, Libro Secondo*, Rome 1980; M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, Berlin 1974. See also other references in note 18 above. These works will be referred to by author's name or author's name and brief title.

²¹ See Fränkel (note 20), p. 264.

den» (fr. 16,7) and «difficult for mortals to discern» (*W. & D.* 483). In Homer Zeus' «hiding» something in his νόος is mentioned in a situation involving the gods (*Od.* XXIV 474); perhaps this νόος is concealed from gods as well as human-beings. Solon refers to the νόος of all the immortals as hidden. Clearly it would be valuable for human-beings to have awareness of its nature, since it is clearly thought to affect significantly the events of their lives²².

Semonides refers to the νόος of human-beings in 1,1-8 W.:

ὦ παῖ, τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος
πάντων ὅσ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίθησ' ὅκη θέλει,
νοῦς δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνθρώποισιν, ἀλλ' ἐπήμεροι
ἃ δὴ βοτὰ ζόουσιν, οὐδὲν εἰδότες
ὅκως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός.
ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας κάπιπειθείη τρέφει
ἄπρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας· οἱ μὲν ἡμέρην
μένουσιν ἐλθεῖν, οἱ δ' ἐτέων περιτροπάς·

«Boy, loud-thundering Zeus holds the outcome of all things that are and places it as he wishes. Νόος is not in men but, subject to the day, they live like grazing animals, knowing in no way how the god will bring each thing to completion. Hopes and confidence nourish us as we ponder the impossible. Some wait for the day to come, others, the turnings of the years»²³. Two features of human-beings are prominent in these lines. First, they lack νόος. In this context Semonides seems to contrast human-beings with the gods. The latter apparently have νόος and it is of a kind that allows them to «hold the outcome» of all events. They evidently see this outcome and have the power to impose it²⁴. Men have no awareness of the τέλος that awaits their actions nor any control over that τέλος²⁵. Instead of a clear apprehension of events, humans have «hope and confidence» which may lead them to consider

²² At Arch. 94,6 W. mention is made of something occurring «by the νόος of the Olympian gods» (App. One, 2). The context, however, is not clear.

²³ For a discussion of this passage see especially Fränkel (note 20), pp. 230-231, Renehan (note 20), pp. 3-11, A. Carson, «How Bad a Poem is Semonides Fragment 1?» in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. D. E. Gerber, Chico, Calif., 1984, pp. 61-68, and D. E. Gerber, «Semonides, Fr. 1 West: A Commentary» in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-128.

²⁴ Cf. Theog. 142 where «the gods complete (τελέω) all things according to their νόος» (App. One, 61) and Theog. 202 where «the νόος of the gods prevails» (App. One, 13).

²⁵ Cf. Theog. 135-136: «nor does any person act, knowing in φρένες whether it will turn out in the end (τέλος) for good or for ill» and Theog. 1075-1076: «it is most difficult to recognise the end (τελευτή) of an incomplete matter, how the god intends to complete (τελέω) it».

actions that will not «reach an end» (*ἀπρηκτον*). Consequently, their attitude is one of waiting and hoping, either for the «day» or the «years», and the changes that these may bring.

The second feature of human-beings is that they are «subject to the day»²⁶. They are somehow moulded by the «day» that they encounter. In Homer *vóos* is specifically mentioned as the part of a person affected by the «day». At *Od.* XVIII 134-137 Odysseus says that in men *vóos* «is such as is the day that the father of men and gods brings upon them»²⁷. Semonides compares humans with animals, moulded by the day, «knowing nothing» of how events will turn out. They are open to the events that come and are shaped by them.

By denying that *vóos* is in human-beings, Semonides focuses upon a particular aspect of this psychic entity: its ability to «see» how events will turn out. In the gods *vóos* easily performs this function. But, regarded in this light, *vóos* becomes something outside the range of man. His essence as «mortal» may be defined by its very absence. In place of *vóos*, Semonides defines man by the presence of something else, namely «hope and confidence». These, however, lead only to considerations that prove impossible or incapable of fulfillment (6-7). Because they lead to such considerations, these two qualities give evidence that *vóos* in truth is absent.

In *Sim.* 8,10 W. (= *Sem.* 29 D.), *vóos* is ascribed to mortals but is said to be of a negative nature²⁸. In lines 1-9, the poet says that the young man never imagines that old age or death will come. He has a *θυμός* that is *κοῦφος*, 'light', 'empty', or 'fickle'. It is of this nature

²⁶ I follow the interpretation offered of *ἐφήμερος* given by H. Fränkel in «Man's "Ephemeris" Nature according to Pindar and Others», *TAPA* 77, 1946, pp. 131-145 = *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, Munich 1960, pp. 23-29, and (note 20), pp. 148-151. This view is found also in E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry*, Berkeley 1979, p. 24. Different interpretations of the term are offered by M. Dickie, «On the Meaning of *ἐφήμερος*», *ICS* 1, 1975, pp. 7-14: «short-lived» and G. Fischetti, «Tre note greche», *AIV* 132, 1973-1974, pp. 155-206: «like the day». Fränkel's interpretation, however, seems most appropriate for the poem of Semonides, especially in light of the reference to the «day» in lines 6-8. On these lines see also the remarks of Gerber (note 23), pp. 127-128, and Fowler (note 20), p. 114, n. 80.

²⁷ Cf. *Arch.* 131 W. and 132 W. where he says that «man's *θυμός* is such as the day brought by Zeus» and men «think as the events they encounter». Cf. too Hes., *W. & D.* 793 where a person's relationship to *vóos* is strongly affected by the day on which he is born. See also below on *Arch.* 130,5 W., *Sol.* 27,11 and 13, and *Stes. P. Lille* 76abc 207 (*App.* One, 57, 21, 54, and 80) for the connection of *vóos* with the «day».

²⁸ The authorship of the poem is in question and it may belong to either poet or perhaps to someone else. For a discussion of this question see Gerber (note 20), p. 64, West (note 20), p. 179, and Adkins (note 20), p. 167.

because of the false hopes that «grow in his chest»²⁹. This «light» *θυμός* suggests a lack of experience on the part of the young person. He also «thinks many things that will not be brought to fulfillment» (*πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ*). These may include both his notions that he will escape sickness and age and the plans for the future he makes in light of such hopes. «Foolish are those whose *νόος* lies (*κεῖμαι*) in this way», Semonides says (10). In this line the poet sums up the attitude of such young people. They are 'fools' (*νήπιοι*). Here *νόος* seems associated with thoughts that will prove *ἀτέλεστα*. We can compare Sem. 1,3 W. where the inability of human-beings to be certain of the «end» of their plans was expressed in terms of their not having *νόος*. Instead, they have «hope and confidence» which lead them to consider things «that will not occur» (*ἀπρηκτον*). In the present poem we see a direct connection between hope and both *θυμός* and *νόος*. It apparently distorts the functions of each of these psychic entities³⁰. It especially prevents the young person from realising that the «time of youth and life is short» (10-12). It does harm by keeping far away all thoughts about what must be the inevitable «end» of human life.

Homer had spoken of youth having a negative effect upon *νόος* (*Il.* XXIII 590, 604). Theognis too will refer to «youth and young impetuosity» making *νόος* «fickle» (629, App. One, 69). Solon will mention *νόος* being «strengthened» in middle age (23,11 W., App. One, 21). But Mimnermus will say that «old age» harms *νόος* (5,8, App. One, 67). The passage of time clearly changes this psychic entity.

In another passage, Theognis mentions a human *νόος* and its relation to *θυμός* (631). «The person in whom *νόος* is not stronger (*κρείσσων*) than *θυμός*, Kyrnus, is always in deceptions (*ἄται*) and the greatest helplessness (*ἀμηχανία*).» Zeus' *νόος* is described as being «stronger» (*κρείσσων*) in Homer (*Il.* XVI 688, XVII 176). In the present passage, within the human, Theognis says that *νόος* should be more forceful than *θυμός*. A *νόος* «weaker than *θυμός*» results evidently in some

²⁹ On the meaning of *κοῦφος* see Campbell, *Golden Lyre* (note 20), p. 213, and Adkins (note 20), p. 170. For the negative effect of hope cf. Solon 13,6 W.: «gaping we take delight in empty (*κοῦφος*) hopes». Contrast, however, the positive effect of hope on Persephone's *νόος* in *H. Cer.* 37. Below we will hear of a *κοῦφος νόος* at Theog. 498 and 580 (App. One, 72 and 44). We will also hear at Theog. 629 (App. One, 69) that «youth and young impetuosity make *νόος* fickle (*ἐπικουφίζω*).» See too the reference to the *φρένες* of the «inexperienced» that are «too light» (*κουφότεροι*) in Pind., *Ol.* VIII 61.

³⁰ For the connection of *νόος* and *θυμός*, see also Hom., *Il.* IV 309, *Od.* XIV 490, Theog. 375 (App. One, 24), 629-630 (App. One, 69), 631 (App. One, 5), and 1053 (App. One, 20).

form of poor thinking and judgement. This makes the person a victim to «deceptions» and «helplessness». The importance of *vóos* as a seat of thought and inner perception and its role in affecting behaviour is emphasized in these lines.

Elsewhere Theognis makes two general remarks about *vóos*. At 622 he says that everyone honours the wealthy man and treats the poor one with contempt. «The same (*αὐτός*) *vóos* is present in all men». In this instance *vóos* signifies the attitude or opinion found in all people. It sums up the way in which they perceive other human-beings³¹. At 1185 Theognis says that «*vóos* is a good thing and the tongue. These grow in few men who are stewards of them both». In other passages too Theognis will relate *vóos* and tongue, saying that both «grow in the chests of the wise» (1163, App. One, 15) and that the drunk person is not «master» of both (479-480, App. One, 60). At 760 he refers to them also in asking Apollo «to guide a straight his *vóos* and tongue» (App. One, 78)³². In the present passage Theognis appears to lament that the intelligent do not speak well and those who may be eloquent are not necessarily wise. Clearly *vóos* over which one is a «steward» is an asset desirable in people. If one is a «steward» of tongue as well, it is even better.

In other passages of Section A *vóos* is qualified in various ways. At line 88 Theognis mentions a «trustworthy» *vóos*: «if you love me and your *vóos* is trustworthy» (*πιστός*)³³. Elsewhere Theognis will say that «few have a trustworthy (*πιστός*) *vóos*» (74, 698, App. One, 41-42). This passage suggests that a «trustworthy» *vóos* will display its feelings authentically. There will not be a discrepancy between inner person and outer behaviour. Homer speaks of this kind of discrepancy (see, e.g., *Od.* II 92 and XIII 255) as does Hesiod (*W. & D.* 714). We see in this reference to *vóos* its importance as a seat of the person's true feelings, its ability to differ from outer behaviour, and its desirable condition described by the adjective 'faithful' or 'trustworthy'.

³¹ Fowler (note 20), pp. 43-44, points out that this line of Theognis and several others mentioning *vóos* in Archilochus, Solon, and Theognis can be called «pseudo-formulae» since the same words appear in the same metrical position. These passages include the following: Arch. 185,5 W.; Sol. 11,6 W.; Theog. 74, 88 = 1082 d, 498, 580, 622, 792, 814, 898, and 1016.

³² Cf. too Hes., fr. 150,14 where «*vóos* is above the tongue» and Sol. 27,13 W. where in the seventh group of seven years a man is «best in *vóos* and tongue» (App. One, 54). See also the opposition of *vóos* and tongue in Sol. 34,3 W., Theog. 91, and 365 (App. One, 51, 39, 32).

³³ This passage of Theognis will be discussed more fully below with lines 87-92 in Section C (App. One, 38-39, 46).

In other passages *vóos* is of a negative nature. At 4,7-9 W., Solon says: «the *vóos* of the leaders of the people is unjust, for whom, from their great insolence (*ὑβρις*), the suffering of great pains is made ready, since they do not know how to check their great prosperity» (*κόρος*). This passage shows certain important features of *vóos*. First, it is associated with justice and its opposite, *ὑβρις*. The latter is related to the presence of *κόρος*. Elsewhere too such an association of *vóos* is mentioned. Hesiod speaks of Dike «telling the *vóos* of unjust men» (W. & D. 260). Solon will relate *vóos* to both *ὑβρις* and *κόρος* (4 c 3; 6,4, App. One, 48, 11). Theognis too will associate *vóos* with justice or its absence in several passages³⁴. Second, *vóos* seems to function as the seat of the thoughts, plans, and will of the leaders. It seems to be a seat too of their moral character and disposition³⁵. Because they are insolent and incapable of handling «great prosperity», punishment awaits them. The source of their behaviour seems largely to be their *vóos* which is «unjust» in nature.

In another poem Solon again describes *vóos* in a negative fashion. In 11,3-8 W. he criticises the Athenians for failing to perceive the intentions of those seeking power. He says of them: each of you walks with the steps of a fox but to all of you together the *vóos* is empty (*χαῦνος*). You look at the tongue and words of a wheedler but do not see the deed that is being done.» Solon suggests that the Athenians are clever enough as individuals but in terms of judgement of leaders, they display an «empty» *vóos*. This pays attention only to what the leaders say and fails to grasp what they are doing. An «empty» *vóos* does not function well in regard to inner or penetrating sight. It is «empty» of any capacity to go beyond appearances and to grasp reality, a capacity associated with *vóos*. Instead, it «sees» only the surface³⁶.

At 6,4 W. Solon mentions yet another negative form of *vóos*. He says: «thus the people would best follow their leaders, neither left too free nor forcibly restrained. For satiety (*κόρος*) breeds insolence (*ὑβρις*), whenever abundant prosperity follows men whose *vóos* is not appropriate» (*ἄρτιος*). The adjective *ἄρτιος* means 'complete', 'suitable', 'exactly

³⁴ See Theog. 154, 202, 373-380, 395, 792, and 897-900 (App. One, 12-14, 16, 23, and 37).

³⁵ Cf. Sol. 22 a W. where Solon says: «he will not trust a leader who errs in his *vóos*» (*ἀμαρτινός*).

³⁶ Cf. Pind., *Pyth.* II 59-61 where a *χαῦνα πρᾶν* fails to grasp a present situation and engages in fruitless struggles. This «empty» *vóos* may be similar to the *κοῦφος νόος* referred to by Theognis at 580 and 498 (App. One, 44, 72).

fitted', or 'appropriate'³⁷. People who do not have a νόος «fitted» for «abundant prosperity» (δλβος) begin a journey to «satiety» (κόρος) and «insolence» (ὑβρις). Above, as we saw, at 4,7-9, Solon said that leaders with an «unjust» νόος face punishment because of their ὑβρις and κόρος. In the present passage he clarifies the sequence by which they err³⁸. Νόος in this passage signifies the capacity a person has for adjusting to «prosperity». When this comes, someone's thinking and attitudes are necessarily affected. If νόος is not «appropriate», it apparently engages in wrong thinking and makes incorrect judgements. The consequences of these, «satiety» and «insolence», are totally negative in nature³⁹.

In a few passages of Section A νόος is described as an active agent. At 202, Theognis says that «the νόος of the gods prevails» (ὑπερέχω), in a situation where a greedy man acquires wealth unjustly. «In the end evil befalls» such a person (202). Theognis contrasts wealth acquired in this fashion with that coming to a man «from Zeus and with justice» (196). This just form proves lasting. Homer and Hesiod describe Zeus' νόος as «stronger», «inescapable», and «impossible to avoid or to frustrate»⁴⁰. Here in Theognis the νόος of the gods is described as «prevailing». It is also one associated with justice. It is the gods' «will» and «intention» that just wealth endure and unjust, fail. This νόος always comes to pass.

Theognis refers to the νόος of Zeus in lines 373-380. At 375 he says that Zeus knows the «νόος and θυμός of each person» (see also below on App. One, 24) and that he has the greatest power. He then asks Zeus, possessing such knowledge and authority: «how does your νόος endure to hold wicked persons and the just man in equal regard, whether their νόος is turned (τρέπω) to moderation (σωφροσύνη) or to insolence (ὑβρις), as they trust in the unjust deeds of men?» Two pictures of νόος are given in these lines. That of Zeus controls human-beings. To some it may seem that the evil and good are treated alike by this νόος but, as we heard at line 202, «the νόος of the gods prevails» and it is one concerned with justice. The νόος of humans described in

³⁷ Cf. Solon's other uses of this adjective at 4,32, 39 W. and 4 c 4 W. Cf. too Theognis who says at 946 that he must «think all things appropriate» (ἀρτια πάντα νοεῖν).

³⁸ Theognis echoes these lines at 153-154 (App. One, 12), changing the general reference of «men» to «an evil man». For the association of ὑβρις and κόρος see also Pind., *Ol.* I 55-57, XIII 10, and Her. VIII 77,1. See too the note of Campbell, *Lyric Poetry* (note 20), p. 245, and Gerber, *Euterpe* (note 20), p. 135.

³⁹ Cf. too the association of νόος with κόρος at Sol. 4 c 3-4 W. (App. One, 48).

⁴⁰ See *Il.* XVI 688, XVI 176; *Od.* V 103, 137; Hes., *Theog.* 613; *W. & D.* 105.

these lines is clearly the seat of their moral character. Zeus knows this *vóos*. It can turn to «moderation» or to «insolence». In the latter case, it is associated with «unjust deeds». Once again, as in Sol. 4,7 W. and 6,4 W. (App. One, 9, 11), we see *vóos* related to justice. It acts as the seat of someone's inclination to admirable or immoral behaviour. Intellectual, emotional, volitional, and moral aspects appear in this reference to *vóos*.

Six passages describe the activity of *vóos* in human-beings. At 1163-1164 Theognis says: «eyes, tongue, ears, and *vóos* grow (*φύω*) in the middle of the chest of men who are wise» (*συνετοί*). Here, as in Homer and Hesiod, and also in other passages of Theognis, *vóos* is located in the chest region (*στήθεα*)⁴¹. In the «wise» eyes, tongue, ears, and *vóos* work, it seems, at a deep level⁴². Their apprehension of events takes place on an inner level. In these people *vóos* perhaps functions well with regard to «inner vision» or understanding of the meaning of events. This couplet of Theognis may suggest too that the wise keep hidden what they see, say, hear, and think. One feature of *vóos* found in Homer and Hesiod is its «hidden» nature⁴³. Persons can conceal their true thoughts and feelings in this psychic entity. Theognis may be suggesting that the wise have a «concealed» *vóos*. Such a *vóos* may prove to be a problem for others but can be a valuable asset for the person himself⁴⁴. Someone wise probably conceals what he is actually thinking, desiring, or feeling. In this way he can guard himself from others.

At 395-397 Theognis associates *vóos* with justice⁴⁵. He says that poverty clarifies which man is 'worthless' (*δειλός*) and which, a «much better person». In the case of the latter, «*vóos* thinks (*φρονέω*) just things (*δικαία*), in whom always straight counsel (*θεῖα γνώμη*) grows in the chest». In the case of the former, «*vóos* follows neither in good or evil situations». In poverty *vóos* in a good man thinks just thoughts⁴⁶. This *vóos* is closely connected with his character and disposition. This person poverty cannot harm. «Straight counsel» is always present in him. This «counsel» may be associated with his *vóos*. But in the

⁴¹ See, e.g., *Il.* III 63, *Od.* XX 366; Hes., *Theog.* 122; *Theog.* 121, 507, and 898 (App. One, 17, 74, 33). See too *Scol.* 889, 2 (App. One, 82).

⁴² See other associations of *vóos* and tongue above on *Theog.* 1185 (App. One, 7) with note 32.

⁴³ See above note 14.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the meaning of this couplet see van Groningen (note 20), p. 423.

⁴⁵ See other such associations above on Sol. 4,7 W., 6,4 W., and *Theog.* 377 (App. One, 9, 11, 14).

⁴⁶ Contrast the «unjust» *vóos* described by Solon in 4,7 W. (App. One, 9).

«worthless» man νόος is never present. He cannot cope with poverty and reveals by his thinking and behaviour his inferior nature. «Straight counsel» is missing in such a person. These two mentions of νόος show how strongly Theognis associated it with moral behaviour. In the «worthless» man it is absent; its «presence» in the good person ensures just actions.

In lines 119-128 Theognis emphasizes the importance of the νόος we encounter in others. He says that a wise man can usually spot phony coinage. «But if the νόος of a friend has escaped notice (λανθάνω), being false (ψυδρός), and he has a deceitful ἥτορ in his φρένες, this god made the most base coinage for mortals and to know it is most painful of all. For you would not know (οἶδα) the νόος of a man or woman before you have made trial of it as of a beast of burden.» He concludes these comments by saying that appearances can deceive. Here, as in Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis 1163, the «hidden» or «concealed» nature of νόος is mentioned. If it is «false» and coupled with a «deceitful» ἥτορ, the evidence someone gives of friendship may be entirely deceptive. Obviously this person's behaviour belies his true feelings and thoughts. He acts in one way, his νόος in another. Other passages too of the lyric poets will emphasize this «hidden» nature of νόος and the ability a person has to conceal his actual feelings in it⁴⁷. In this psychic entity a person's true essence seems to be found. Ideally νόος and behaviour will match. When they do not, the discovery of this situation can prove very painful to others.

At 683-686 Theognis says that «many ignorant (αἰδριες) men have much wealth» but others, wishing 'noble actions' (τὰ καλά), are hampered by poverty. He says that 'helplessness' (ἀμηχανίη) attends both these groups: «money restrains the one, νόος, the other». In the «ignorant» rich, νόος is of a defective kind. It keeps these people in «helplessness». Although they have money, they do not seem to be capable of «noble behaviour». Homer (*Od.* XI 272) and Hesiod (*W. & D.* 687) both refer to αἰδρεία of νόος, describing a lack of intelligence. Theognis seems to imply more a moral context in his use of the term in this passage⁴⁸. The possession of νόος appears to be the source of good will and admirable, moral behaviour. Unfortunately, in his view, the wrong people have it.

⁴⁷ See on Sol. 34,3 W. (App. One, 51), Theog. 74, 87-92, 365-368, 500, 598, 698, 814, 898, and 1016 (App. One, 23, 26-28, 34-35, 38-39, 41-42, 73) and Scol. 889,2 (App. One, 82). Cf. also Homer and Hesiod in note 14 above. See too the reference to the νόος of the gods as ἀφανής in Sol. 17 W. (App. One, 1).

⁴⁸ See the comments of van Groningen (note 20), p. 269.

In lines 1049-1054 Theognis refers to *νόος* three times as he advises Kyrnus:

σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ οἶά τε παιδί πατήρ ὑποθήσομαι αὐτὸς
 ἐσθλά· σὺ δ' ἐν θυμῷ καὶ φρεσὶ ταῦτα βάλευ.
 μήποτ' ἐπειγόμενος πράξεις κακόν, ἀλλὰ βαθείη
 σῇ φρενὶ βούλευσαι σῶι ἀγαθῷ τε νόωι.
 τῶν γὰρ μαινομένων πέτεται θυμός τε νόος τε,
 βουλή δ' εἰς ἀγαθὸν καὶ νόον ἐσθλὸν ἄγει.

«I myself, as a father, his child, will give you noble advice. You place this in your *θυμός* and *φρένες*. Never, being pressed upon, do evil, but with your deep *φρήν* and good *νόος* take counsel. For the *θυμός* and *νόος* of those who are maddened flutter about, but counsel leads even the noble *νόος* to good». This passage mentions three psychic entities, all concerned with intellectual activity⁴⁹. At 1050 *θυμός* and *φρένες* are to be the locations where Kyrnus puts the advice he receives. At 1052 he is to «take counsel with his deep *φρήν* and good *νόος*». At 1053-1054, he is to be unlike those whose *θυμός* and *νόος* «flutter about»; he is to pay attention to *βουλή*, which leads «even the noble *νόος*» to good action. All three psychic entities function better when they are used calmly by a person. If Kyrnus acts in this manner, he will be led to good rather than evil actions.

In these lines Kyrnus is to «take counsel (*βουλεύω*) with a deep *φρήν* and good (*ἀγαθός*) *νόος*». As mentioned in the Introduction, *νόος* in Homer is associated with *βουλή* and *βουλεύω*⁵⁰. In Theognis, this *νόος* is a «good» one. Here, as in lines 683-686 (App. One, 19), a moral connotation may be present in *νόος*. By its thoughts and desires, a «good» *νόος* may bring about admirable moral behaviour⁵¹. In line 1052 *νόος* is an instrument or accompaniment with which Kyrnus can act (see below, App. One, 30). At 1053 Theognis says that the *θυμός* and *νόος* of those «maddened flutter about» (*πέτομαι*)⁵². This *νόος*, in a negative condition, may cause reprehensible actions. Both psychic entities, «fluttering about», may not prove receptive to «counsel». As Theognis says in 1054 (see also below, App. One, 65), this «counsel»

⁴⁹ For a detailed discussion of this passage see van Groningen (note 20), pp. 390-391, and Darcus, *AC* 46, 1977, pp. 47-51.

⁵⁰ See above note 4.

⁵¹ Cf. too Theognis 395-397 (App. One, 16-17) discussed above where *νόος* «thinks just thoughts».

⁵² For the connection of *νόος* and *θυμός* see above on Theog. 631 (App. One, 5) and note 30.

can lead «even a noble *vóos* to good action». This time *vóos* is called *εσθλός*, a description given of it also in Homer⁵³. This adjective too suggests some moral involvement of *vóos*. «Counsel» has the effect of leading such a *vóos* to admirable behaviour. This line shows how strong an influence upon a person's actions *vóos* can have. If it is «led to good», he acts admirably. Person and *vóos* thus seem to be closely identified.

In two passages of Section A *vóos* is acted upon. At Sol. 27,11 W. *vóos* in the sixth group of seven years is described as «being strengthened (*καταρτύω*) in all respects». Solon also says of the person of this age: «he no longer wishes as before to do the impossible». Above, in Sim. 8,1-10 W. (= Sem. 29 D.), we heard criticism of the young person for being filled with false hopes. He was described as «thinking many things that would not be brought to fulfillment» (7). We heard too in Sem. 1,1-8 W. how «hope and confidence» cause people to «ponder the impossible». Solon says that the person in his middle years no longer entertains impossible desires. The «strengthening» of *vóos*, then, may involve some grasp or awareness of reality, namely of what the human-being can accomplish and what end awaits him.

This passage shows as well how time changes *vóos*. As described above in the discussion of Sim. 8, 1-10 W., *vóos* is thought by the lyric poets both to be vulnerable to youth and also to be harmed by old age. In this passage Solon suggest that it is made stronger after the age of fourty. In the same poem, at 27,13, he will say that in the seventh and eighth group of sevens, a person is «best in *vóos* and tongue» (see below, App. One, 54). The «strengthening» of *vóos* leads to a time of mental flourishing that lasts for fourteen years.

At Theognis 379 (discussed above with line 377, App. One, 14), *vóos* is described as «being turned to moderation or to insolence». This passage suggest the different moral attitudes that *vóos* could express. The person's behaviour is determined by the «direction» of *vóos*. Its influence in this regard seem very strong. Homer too had spoken of *vóos* as being «turned» (*Il.* XVII 546, *Od.* III 147, VII 263). It is clearly a changeable entity within the person.

In the remaining passages of Section A, *vóos* is described as an entity «known» or «recognised». These passages suggest the important role that *vóos* was thought to have within the person. At 897-900⁵⁴,

⁵³ See *Il.* XIII 732, *Od.* VII 73; Hes., fr. 10 (a) 88 (possibly). See also references to a «noble» *vóos* in Theog. 223, 792, and 1271 (see App. Two).

⁵⁴ For a discussion of these lines and their meaning see West (note 20), pp. 160-161.

Theognis says that if the god, «knowing (γινώσκω) νόος, what sort each person has», were to be angry with mortals for all they did, great suffering would befall «both the just and unjust man». As we have seen in other passages⁵⁵, νόος is related to justice. In this case it seems to be the source of just or unjust actions as well as of all the activities that human-beings engage in. In particular it is the well-spring of moral activity which, in all cases, seems to fall short of the perfect. Although this νόος may on occasion be hidden from other human-beings, the gods «recognise» what kind each person has⁵⁶.

In some circumstances a human-being may know the νόος of another. At 598 Theognis tells Kyrnus: «associate with other men who know (οἶδα) your νόος better». Νόος seems to be closely connected with the disposition or character of Kyrnus⁵⁷. Theognis suggests that he will be happier with those who understand and sympathise with his way of thinking, his feelings, and his desires, all apparently to be found in νόος⁵⁸.

In two passages 367 = 1184 a, Theognis complains: «I am not able to know (γινώσκω) the νόος of the citizens, what sort they have; for I please them neither by good deeds or bad». What the citizens are actually thinking and feeling cannot be detected by Theognis. Their νόος is hidden from him. As we learned above on Theognis 121-128 (App. One, 18) νόος can be concealed from others⁵⁹. When this occurs, it can cause perplexity, as it does in Theognis.

At 439-440 Theognis observes: «foolish is the man who holds my νόος under surveillance but pays no attention to his own concerns»⁶⁰. Here νόος seems to be the source of Theognis' actions. Someone who is more concerned about what another is thinking, feeling, or willing to the neglect of his own affairs is «foolish». As in Sim. 8,10 W., a wrong

⁵⁵ See above on Sol. 4,7 W., 6,4 W., and Theog. 154, 202, 377, and 395 (App. One, 9, 11-14, 16). See too below on Theog. 792, and Sim. 26A P. (App. One, 37 and 56).

⁵⁶ Cf. Hom., *Il.* XXII 382, *Od.* I 3, XXI 205, and Hes., fr. 43 a 76, where a form of γινώσκω also appears with νόος. See too Theog. 375 (discussed above with 377 at App. One, 22) where Zeus «knows (οἶδα) the νόος and θυμός of each». Cf. *Od.* IV 493, Hes., fr. 43 a 52 and 76 for a similar use of the verb οἶδα.

⁵⁷ See the perceptive remarks of van Groningen (note 20), pp. 237-238 on this passage.

⁵⁸ Cf. too Theog. 125 (discussed above with 121 at App. One, 18) where he says: «you would not know (οἶδα) the νόος of a man or woman before making trial of it, as of a beast of burden».

⁵⁹ See also note 47 for other instances of a «hidden» νόος.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of this passage see van Groningen (note 20), pp. 175-177, and Renehan (note 20), pp. 23-24. I follow the text of the latter.

way of thinking marks a person as νήπιος, «lacking sense». In the case of both persons mentioned in the lines of Theognis, νόος functions prominently as the source of their behaviour.

Section A: Observations. In these 29 passages νόος displays certain prominent features.

(1) First, it acts as an active agent within the person (App. One, 13-20). It can, e. g., «grow», «think just thoughts», «prevail», or «flutter about». Second, it can be «turned» in some direction or «strengthened» (App. One, 21-22). Person and νόος remain distinct but νόος strongly influences his behaviour.

(2) The passages in which νόος appears as a entity «known» (App. One, 23-29) illustrate its marked influence upon the actions of individuals. Such occurrences suggest that a person's nature is to a large degree reflected in his νόος.

(3) Νόος can vary in nature. It can be positive: πιστός, κρέσσων, or ἄρτιος (App. One, 5, 18, 11-12). Or negative: ἄδικος, χαῦνος, or ψυδρός (App. One, 9-10, 17). It seems to change with the «day» that men encounter (App. One, 3) and with the years that pass by (App. One, 21).

(4) Νόος is associated with moral behaviour, especially justice and its opposites, satiety and insolence (App. One, 9, 11, 13-14, 16-17, 22-24).

(5) Within the person νόος can be «hidden» (App. One, 15, 18, 26-28). It is also associated with the «tongue» (App. One, 7). It seems very much to function as a seat of a person's character, disposition, or temperament (see especially, 8, 18, 20, 22, 27-29). His essential nature seems to be found in νόος.

Section B. A Person Acts in, by, or with νόος.

Section B contains only three passages. In these νόος serves as a location where a person acts, an instrument that he acts with, or as an accompaniment to his actions. The fragmentary nature of the evidence may partly account for the limited number of such occurrences of νόος, but it may also be the case that it did not function frequently in this way. At Theognis 1052 (discussed above with lines 1049-1054, App. One, 20), Kyrnus is to «take counsel with his deep φρήν and good νόος». Here a «good» νόος is an instrument that Kyrnus uses, probably to form plans that have a moral aspect. At 1237 Theognis ascribes a similar function to νόος when he tells Kyrnus: «strive to understand

(*συνοπάω*) a saying with your *νόος*». He urges Kyrnus to grasp the meaning of what he says by using his *νόος* as an instrument. *Νόος* too may engage in activity of its own in this situation and act as an accompaniment to Kyrnus⁶¹.

In the third passage of Section B Theognis tells Kyrnus: «check yourself in your *νόος*; let gentleness of tongue always follow. In truth the heart (*καρδίη*) of the worthless is rather sharp» (*ὀξύτερη*). Kyrnus is to curb what he may be thinking and always speak in a gentle way⁶². Several features of *νόος* are apparent here. First, as we saw in Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7), it is connected with the tongue (see too note 32). Second, in this situation, it can differ from speech and thus, in its essence, be a «hidden» psychic entity⁶³. In it are to be found Kyrnus' true feelings and reactions. Third, it seems to be an entity over which Kyrnus can exert some control⁶⁴. He is to «check» the way he is thinking or feeling and to speak in a different way.

Section C. A Person Has a Direct Relationship with *νόος*.

In 21 passages of the lyric poets someone relates directly to *νόος*. These occurrences suggest that a person exerted some control over this psychic entity. In ten passages the verb *ἔχω* appears. Someone either «has» *νόος* or «holds» it in some way. Both Homer and Hesiod also spoke of *νόος* in this fashion⁶⁵. At 96,2⁶⁶, Sappho describes a girl absent in Lydia as «often holding her *νόος* here». *Νόος* seems able to visualize a far-off place. This function of *νόος* is found also in *Il.* XV 80-83 where it «leaps in thought» as a man remembers places he has visited.

Theognis mentions the *νόος* that others have. He speaks of «testing» (*ἐξετάζω*) the *νόος* of friends (1016) and «knowing» (*οἶδα*) the *νόος* of enemies (814). In both cases the «hidden» nature of *νόος* is implied: it is something that Theognis has to search out. Archilochus describes a vixen that has a «cunning» (*πικνός*) *νόος*. At *Il.* XV 461 Zeus' *νόος* is

⁶¹ On this passage see Vetta (note 20), p. 46.

⁶² On this passage see Garzya (note 20), p. 199, and van Groningen (note 20), p. 145.

⁶³ For other passages where this is so, see above on Theog. 121-128 (App. One, 18) with note 47.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Od.* XIX 42 where Telemachus is told to «check» (*κατὰ ... λαχάνω*) his *νόος*. Cf. too Sol. 4 c 3 W. (App. One, 48) where one is to «place a great *νόος* in measure».

⁶⁵ See *Il.* IV 309, XXII 382; *Od.* II 124, XIV 490; Hes., *Theog.* 262.

⁶⁶ I follow the text of Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (note 20), p. 89, and Campbell, *Greek Lyric* (note 20), p. 120, who restore [ν]ῶν.

described as «wise», *πυκινός*. The wily nature of a fox, it seems, is to be found in its νόος⁶⁷.

At 792 Theognis expresses the wish that he «have a noble (*ἔσθλός*) νόος among good people, harming neither stranger nor citizen with baneful deeds, but being just». Once again we see νόος associated with moral qualities, specifically with justice⁶⁸. Here νόος is called «noble». As in other passages where this adjective appears⁶⁹, it seems to have a moral connotation. This passage shows how closely a person identified with νόος. In this instance it signifies the seat of Theognis' character and is related to his being a «just» person.

In another passage Theognis speaks of both νόος and φρένες being «held» (87-92):

μή μ' ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε, νόον δ' ἔχε καὶ φρένας ἄλλῃ,
εἴ με φιλεῖς καὶ σοι πιστός ἐνεστι νόος.
ἢ με φίλει καθαρὸν θέμενος νόον, ἢ μ' ἀποειπῶν
ἐχθαιρ' ἀμφαδίην νεῖκος δειράμενος.

«Do not love me and hold your νόος and φρένες in another direction, if you love me and your νόος within is trustworthy. Either love me, putting on a pure (*καθαρός*) νόος, or refuse and hate me, raising a quarrel openly. The man who with one tongue holds νόος in two ways is a terrible companion, Kyrnus, better an enemy than a friend.» These lines contain four mentions of νόος. They emphasize in particular its hidden nature and the ways in which exterior behaviour can fail to reflect what it is really like. In a way similar to Hesiod in *W. & D.* 714, Theognis pleads for behaviour to be an authentic expression of νόος. Kyrnus is to hate or to love, according to his actual feelings.

In these lines Theognis first tells Kyrnus not to hold both his φρένες and νόος «in another direction», if his affection for Theognis is real and if his νόος is «trustworthy» (*πιστός*). Clearly Kyrnus could be inwardly keeping his affections elsewhere. He should not, if his outer show of affection is to be trusted as an expression of his actual thinking. Next, Theognis calls for Kyrnus to put on a «pure» νόος in showing love. This adjective, like *πιστός*, suggests a νόος that expresses itself in actions which reflect its true nature. Thirdly, Theognis describes the person with «one tongue» and «divided» νόος as belonging most fit-

⁶⁷ For the context of this poem of Archilochus see Campbell, *Golden Lyre* (note 20), p. 130, and Burnett (note 20), p. 63.

⁶⁸ For other instances see on Theog. 898 (App. One, 23) above with note 55.

⁶⁹ See above on Theog. 1054 with note 53. See too App. Two.

tingly to the realm of «enemy»⁷⁰. In his speech Kyrnus evidently expresses friendship but his νόος contains both friendly and unfriendly thoughts. Since his words reflect only one of the directions his νόος moves in, they are deceitful. He is, as Theognis describes someone in line 63, only ἀπὸ γλώσσης φίλος. The full nature of his νόος remains hidden.

This passage of Theognis illustrates how closely νόος is connected with the attitude and feelings of an individual. It is clearly involved in emotion in this situation. The love or hate that Kyrnus experiences is centered in νόος. His behaviour, ideally, will perfectly reflect what his νόος thinks, feels, and desires. If it does not, νόος still remains the seat of feeling, only in this case its true nature is hidden and protected by deceptive actions⁷¹.

In another passage Theognis tells Kyrnus: «do not hold your νόος on impossible deeds» (ἀπρήκτα). We heard above that humans, buoyed up by hope, consider things that will be impracticable (Sem. 1,3 W., App. One, 3). This is especially true of the young person (Sim. 8,10 W., App. One, 4). In middle age a person ceases to set his heart on «impossible deeds» (Sol. 27,11 W., App. One, 21). Theognis suggests that this type of thinking is within one's control and urges against it. Νόος is better employed in dealing with deeds that can be brought to fulfillment.

In five other passages Theognis describes different kinds of νόος that people can have. In these instances the degree to which a person's disposition or character is to be found in νόος is very marked. At 74 he warns Kyrnus not to share all his activities with his friends, since «few have a trustworthy (πιστός) νόος». Likewise, at 698, he says that in bad times he is not surrounded by friends since «few have a trustworthy (πιστός) νόος». Once again we see the «hidden» nature of νόος: people seem to be friends in their outward actions but fail to be so in fact. At Theognis 87-92 (discussed above, App. One, 38), we heard that a «trustworthy» νόος shows forth its true thoughts and feelings. This is a rare occurrence in men, in Theognis' view.

At 109 Theognis says that the 'worthless' (δειλοί) are never grateful for acts of kindness: «for the evil have an insatiate (ἀπληστος) νόος.» This νόος is the seat of selfish desires. It is never satisfied. It resembles the νόος that is not 'appropriate' (ἄρτιος) described by Solon (6,4 W.)

⁷⁰ See the connection of νόος and tongue above on Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7) with note 32.

⁷¹ For further discussion on this passage, see above on line 1053 (App. One, 20), Darcus, AC 46, 1977, pp. 41-45, and Campbell, *Golden Lyre* (note 20), p. 25.

and Theognis (154), one that did not know how to cope with prosperity and led to hybris. Theognis speaks of a negative *vóos* too at 580. A woman says: «I hate the evil man... having the empty (*κοῦφος*) *vóos* of a small bird.»⁷² Like the *κοῦφος θυμός* mentioned above in Sim. 8,1-10 W. (App. One, 4), this type of *vóos* appears to be «empty», «fickle», or «unsubstantial»⁷³. As we will hear below, wine can make *vóos* «fickle» (Theog. 498, App. One, 72). In the present passage the intellectual power of an evil person appears to be limited and his thoughts, trivial.

At 1267 Theognis says that a horse and child «have a similar (*ὁμοῖος*) *vóos*.» Each shows regard only for the person currently paying him attention. As with the other negative descriptions of *vóos*, undesirable and unpleasant traits of character are associated with it. The person seems very much to be identified with this psychic entity.

In three passages a person exerts some control over *vóos* with the verb *τίθημι*. At Theognis 89 (discussed above with 87, App. One, 38), Kyrnus is to «put on a pure *vóos*.» This was one honest in the affection it showed. Sol. 901,2 also mentions this kind of *vóos*, speaking of a woman, involved in a holy offering, who «puts on a pure *vóos*.» In this context the adjective implies: «free from guilt». Solon at 4 c 3 W. gives advice: «you, keeping quiet your mighty *ἦτορ* in your *φρένες*, who drove into satiety (*κόρος*) of many good things, put your great (*μέγας*) *vóos* within measure. For neither will we be persuaded nor will these things be appropriate (*ἄρτια*) for you.» Here *vóos* is associated with *κόρος*, as it is in Sol. 6,4 W. (App. One, 11), where it «breeds hybris for those whose *vóos* is not appropriate» (*ἄρτιος*). In the present passage of Solon *κόρος* appears to have «enlarged» *vóos*. A «great» *vóos* in this context is negative. Elsewhere the adjective is used positively of this psychic entity⁷⁴. The call to place such a *vóos* «in measure» shows that a person had some control over it, just as in Theog. 365 (App. One, 32), where Kyrnus is to «check himself» in his *vóos*. Solon urges moderation in desires. All things otherwise in the future will not be «appropriate» for these people because they will not take place in a way that suits what their «great» *vóos* would wish.

The remaining instances of Section C suggest differing relationships between person and *vóos*. At 581,1, Simonides asks: «who, trusting in

⁷² I follow West in ascribing the *vóos* to the man. See too his suggestions of the identity of the female speaker in (note 20), p. 156. In contrast, Garzya (note 20), p. 92, and van Groningen (note 20), p. 229 ascribe the *vóos* to the woman herself.

⁷³ Cf. Soph., *Ant.* 343: *κουφονόων φύλον ὀρνίθων*. On *κοῦφος* see above note 29 and also Garzya (note 20), p. 225.

⁷⁴ See *H. Cer.* 37 and Hes., *Theog.* 37.

his νόος, would praise Cleobulus?» In his view, the ruler of Lindos was foolish in his claim that his *stele* would withstand the effects of time. He failed to realise that «all things are less than the gods», especially the works of men (581,5-7). This passage suggests that the function of νόος was considered valuable, its judgements sound. It is associated here with the awareness that the wise have about what endures and what does not. It has some form of «inner vision» in this regard.

In one fragment of Alcaeus, 363,1 someone «sends his νόος soaring high» (ἀέρω)⁷⁵. A person does this perhaps in pride. If this is the situation, this νόος resembles the «great» νόος mentioned by Solon that is swollen by ambition. A person evidently has some control over νόος but whether he can safely «lift it on high» is doubtful.

At 34,1-6 W. Solon speaks of νόος in a way that illustrates its «hidden» nature. He says that certain men thought that he would act on their behalf and make them rich. They imagined that his kind words to their enemies simply concealed harsh intentions for the future. Solon says that they hoped that he, «uttering smooth complaisance would show forth a harsh (τραχύς) νόος.» But, in thinking this way, «they pondered empty considerations» (4). Here an assumption is made that outer behaviour does not reflect νόος. Solon's true thoughts and plans are supposed to be concealed within. In fact, in this situation, νόος and outer behaviour did match, much to the chagrin of Solon's enemies.

Finally, in Section C, Theognis speaks twice of the «destruction» of νόος, brought about by the person himself. At 35-38 he suggests that noble behaviour depends on what νόος has been exposed to. «You will learn noble acts (ἐσθλά) from noble men (ἐσθλοί). If you mingle with evil persons, you will destroy (ἀπόλλυμι) even the νόος you have.» The association with morality that νόος has is evident here. It appears in Kyrnus to be the set of his intellect, will, and good character. If he keeps bad company, he is in danger of «losing» or «destroying» this νόος. Right associations and good counsel are needed to sustain this νόος with its potential goodness. At 1271 he says that someone «has destroyed a noble (ἐσθλός) νόος from greed» (μαργοσύνη). Once again, as in other passages of Theognis, νόος is called «noble»⁷⁶. Here, it was one with positive moral inclinations. Excessive desires of some sort, however, have removed its nobility. In both these passages the control that a person exerts over νόος is very apparent. Moral behaviour is to

⁷⁵ I follow here the text and interpretation of Campbell, *Greek Lyric* (note 20), p. 394.

⁷⁶ On this adjective see above on Theog. 1049-1054 (App. One, 20) with note 53. See too App. Two for other instances in Theognis.

a large degree dependent on the type of *vóos* that one strives to maintain within.

Section C: Observations. In these 21 passages of Section C a person relates directly to *vóos*. They make evident the control that an individual had over *vóos*. In 10 passages it is a psychic entity that a person can «have» or «hold» (App. One, 33-42). It is also one that he can «place» (App. One, 46-48). Someone too can «trust», «lift», «show forth», or «destroy» *vóos*. These passages suggest the following features of *vóos*.

(1) It can be of different kinds. On the positive side it can be 'noble', 'trustworthy', 'pure', and 'clever' (App. One, 36-37, 41-42, 46-47, 53). On the negative side, it can be 'insatiate', 'fickle', 'harsh', or (too) 'great' (App. One, 43-44, 48, 51).

(2) *Nóos* is very much associated with moral behaviour (App. One, 37-39, 41-46, 48, 50, 52-53). It is related to justice (App. One, 37) and to its opposite, pride (App. One, 43, 48, 50).

(3) In these passage the «hidden» nature of *vóos* is very evident (App. One, 34-35, 38-39, 41-42, 46, 51). The possibility that outer behaviour conceals a *vóos* of quite different persuasions is a very real one and a potential source of pain for others.

(4) Once again *vóos* is closely associated with a person's disposition or character (App. One, 37-39, 43, 45-46). His deepest personal qualities seem closely connected with this psychic entity. It functions too as a seat of his feelings of affection or otherwise for another person (App. One, 34-35, 38-39, 46).

Section D. A Person Is Described in relation to vóos.

In 10 passages a person is spoken of specifically in relation to *vóos*. In three of these, a person's relation to *vóos* is positive. At Sol. 27,13 W. someone in his seventh and eighth group of seven years is called «best in *vóos* and tongue.» For fourteen years he flourishes mentally and verbally. Here, as in passages discussed above⁷⁷, *vóos* and tongue are associated. In this instance the excellence of both seems to be present⁷⁸.

At 542,2 Simonides begins the Scopas poem: «for a man to be truly good, fashioned without fault in hands, feet, and *vóos*, four-square, is

⁷⁷ See above on Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7) with note 32.

⁷⁸ Contrast Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7) where he says that «few are stewards» of both tongue and *vóos*.

difficult⁷⁹.» Simonides draws upon a Pythagorean image of the square to indicate the perfect person. He is so in hands, feet, and νόος. The three aspects chosen recall *Il.* XV 641-643 where Periphetes is described as excellent in feet and νόος. As we have seen above, particularly in Section C, νόος is connected with moral character. Here too Simonides treats it as a location of someone's moral disposition. As he says in the rest of the poem, only the gods can make the achievement of goodness possible; the most man himself can accomplish on his own is «willingly to do nothing shameful» (542,11-40). But «being good», when it does happen in someone, occurs in νόος and body. The degree to which a person is identified with his νόος is made clear in these lines. In another poem, epigram 26A P. (= 85,4 D.), Simonides specifically praises Archedice for her relation to νόος: «she, being daughter, sister, wife, and mother of tyrants, was not lifted up (αἴρω) in νόος to arrogance» (ἀτασθαλίη). We have seen above the association of νόος with satiety and hybris⁸⁰. In the present case, although there may have been great cause, Archedice did not become proud or haughty. Νόος in this passage appears to be the seat of her moral character.

In four passages of Section D, a person's relation to νόος is negative. At 130,1-5 W. Archilochus describes how easily the gods raise up someone who has fallen or knock an upright individual down. In the case of the latter, the victim «roams in need of a livelihood, unhinged (παρήγορος) of νόος». The adjective παρήγορος is found twice in Homer, meaning 'sprawling' or 'flighty' in thought (*Il.* VII 156, XXIII 603). In this passage of Archilochus νόος seems unable to function well. The gods have damaged the man's power to think, judge, or make choices. These lines illustrate the importance of νόος as the psychic entity that allows him, if it is working well, to cope with the problems he faces.

At 223 Theognis says that the individual who thinks that he alone is wise and that his neighbour knows nothing «is foolish (ἄφρων), harmed (βλάπτω) of a noble (ἔσθλός) νόος.» Here, as elsewhere in Theognis (see App. Two), νόος is ἔσθλός. In this context the adjective appears to refer to intellectual capacity. This νόος lacks good judgement, having been «harmed» or «injured» in some way⁸¹.

⁷⁹ On this passage see the remarks of Campbell, *Lyric Poetry* (note 20), p. 386, Gerber, *Euterpe* (note 20), pp. 319-320, and Fowler (note 20), pp. 84-85.

⁸⁰ See on Sol. 6,4 W. (App. One, 11) with note 38. On this passage see too Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (note 20), p. 239.

⁸¹ Cf. also Theog. 705 (App. One, 79) where Persephone harms νόος. On the genitive with βλάπτω, see Garzya (note 20), p. 173, and van Groningen (note 20), p. 87.

At 1025 Theognis says that the «worthless (δειλοί) in evil times become more frivolous (ματαιότεροι) in νόος, but the actions of the good are straighter.» The way in which evil people relate to νόος appears to be ever «flighty» or «frivolous» but in evil times it becomes even more so. As we heard above at Theognis 397 (App. One, 17), νόος does not follow «worthless people in good or evil situations». In the present passage the relationship of person to νόος is described as one permanently marred.

In 480 Theognis says that the individual who «passes the measure of drinking is no longer master (καρτερός) of tongue or νόος.» As often above, we have here a connection of tongue and νόος⁸². Speech, thought, and will are all adversely affected by wine⁸³. A man cannot control what he is thinking or saying under its influence.

In the final three passages of Section D, the expression «according to (κατά) my νόος» is found⁸⁴. First, at lines 133-142 Theognis contrasts mortals and the gods. The former act without knowing the «end» (τέλος) of their activities and often the unexpected happens (133-138). They are held in the «limits of helplessness» (139). «As human-beings, we think vain things (μάταια), knowing nothing. The gods bring all things to completion (τελοῦσι) according to their νόος.» This passage recalls Sem. 1,3 W. (App. One, 3) where Zeus was described as holding the «end (τέλος) of all things» and placing it where he willed; men, in contrast, have no νόος. In this passage of Theognis νόος appears to be the seat of the gods' thoughts, plans, and will. Whatever their νόος wishes, they can complete⁸⁵. In human-beings νόος may likewise be the seat of their plans and intentions but the «end» does not lie in their control. As Theognis said also in 202 (App. One, 13), «the νόος of the gods prevails», so here its unavoidable nature is made clear.

The «completion» of something according to νόος is mentioned also at lines 341-350. Theognis asks Zeus to «complete» (τελέω) his prayer in which he asks for some good fortune for himself and vengeance on his enemies. He requests: «a good divinity (δαίμων) who would complete (τελέω) these things according to my νόος.» Theognis' wishes, desires, and hopes for the future are to be found in his νόος. The com-

⁸² For other instances see on Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7) above with note 32.

⁸³ Cf. Hes., fr. 239,3 where wine «binds feet, hands, tongue, and νόος in bonds.» See too below Theog. 498, 500, and 507 (App. One, 72-74) where wine likewise affects νόος.

⁸⁴ This expression is found also in Hom., *Il.* IX 108.

⁸⁵ Cf. the passages in Homer and Hesiod where νόος is completed: *Il.* XXIII 149, *Od.* XXII 215, *H. Her.* 10; Hes., *Theog.* 1002. In the last two instances it is Zeus' νόος that is «completed».

pletion of these, however, is not in his control (as we heard also at 142). But, if some «divinity» were to want the same, his prayer would be fulfilled.

At Scol. 908,2 this view is expressed: «the man who does not betray his friend has great honour among mortals and gods, according to my νόος.» Here νόος appear to be the location of someone's opinion or attitude. In this case it is involved in a moral judgement.

Section D: Observations. In these 10 passages some relationship between person and νόος is indicated. This can be positive: «best» or «good» in νόος (App. One, 54-55). Or negative: «unhinged» of νόος, «frivolous» in νόος, or «not master» of it (App. One, 56, 59-60). Certain features of νόος are again evident. Intellectual activity is centered in it (App. One, 54, 58, 60, 61-63). It is associated with moral character and judgements (App. One, 55, 59, 63). It acts as the seat of a person's attitudes, wishes, and opinions (App. One, 61-63). It is strongly connected with the disposition and temperament of an individual (App. One, 55-56, 58-59).

Section E. Outside Objects Affect νόος.

In 11 passages the lyric poets speak of outside forces that affect νόος directly. These passages show how vulnerable νόος could be to outside influences. The boundaries of this psychic entity were not strictly defined. It could be altered from without.

At 633 Theognis advises Kyrnus: «take counsel (βουλεύω) two and three times on whatever comes to your νόος; for the turbulent (λάβρος) man is blinded by deception» (ἀτηρός). As in 1052 (App. One, 30), where Kyrnus was to «take counsel with his good νόος», here too Theognis associates this activity with νόος. As mentioned in the Introduction, Homer often connects νόος with 'counsel' (see note 4). Whatever thoughts, ideas, or suggestions come to νόος are to be scrutinized. Otherwise, 'deception' becomes a strong possibility. At 1054 (discussed above with 1053, App. One, 20), Theognis similarly praises the value of counsel (βουλή): it «leads even a noble νόος to good action.»

The remaining influences said to affect νόος are negative in nature. At 124 b W. Archilochus teases a friend who came uninvited to a banquet: «your stomach (γαστήρ) led your νόος and φρένες into shamelessness» (ἀναιδείη). Both psychic entities are associated here with desires that led to socially unacceptable behaviour. This person did not show good judgement in this situation.

At 5,7-8 Mimnermus vividly describes the effects of old age: «hateful and dishonoured, it makes a man unrecognisable and, being poured around, it harms (*βλάπτω*) eyes and *νόος*.» The image here seems to be that of old age «clouding» or «veiling» *νόος*⁸⁶. When this occurs, the «inner vision» of *νόος* seems to be damaged. In this passage *νόος* functions as a seat of intellectual activity, one harmed by time. In our discussion of Sim. 8,1-10 W. (App. One, 4) and Sol. 27,11 and 13 W. (App. One, 21, 54), we saw how *νόος* changes with time. Unfortunately in old age it suffers injury.

At 202 above (App. One, 13), we heard that the «gods' *νόος* prevails»: the person attaining unjust wealth is finally punished. At 203 Theognis says: «this deceives (*ἀπατάω*) the *νόος* of men», namely that the gods do not punish unjust persons instantly. Here *νόος* can be «deceived». Homer and Hesiod likewise speak of the deception of *νόος*⁸⁷. In this case *νόος* fails to «see» the way in which the gods act. As a result, it apparently encourages a person to abide in unjust behaviour, which brings inevitable punishment.

In another passage, 629-630, Theognis laments the effects of a particular age: «youth (*ἡβη*) and young impetuosity (*νεότης*) make *νόος* unsubstantial (*ἐπικουφίζω*) and lift *θυμός* into error (*ἀμπλακία*) in many things.» Like Homer who twice mentions the adverse influence of youth on *νόος* (*Il.* XXIII 590, 604), Theognis notes its «trivializing» effect. We heard above of the «*κοῦφος νόος* of an evil man» at Theog. 580 (App. One, 44)⁸⁸. Wine too will make *νόος* such (Theog. 498, App. One, 72). As in the situation where one «destroys his *νόος*» (Theog. 36, 1271, App. One, 52-53), here youth somehow damages the judgement and valuable thoughts that his *νόος* may be capable of expressing. Also affecting *θυμός* adversely, it may lead to immoral behaviour. This passage, like so many others, may associate *νόος* with such negative moral actions.

Theognis speaks of three other forces that negatively affect *νόος*. First, he describes «necessity». At 193-196, in mentioning a man who makes an unworthy marriage, he says: «necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) makes (*τίθημι*) *νόος* reckless» (*τλήμων*). The values and judgements that *νόος* may normally express are distorted by «necessity». This leads *νόος* to make choices that it otherwise would not. *Νόος* thus proves vulnerable to unfavourable outside circumstances.

⁸⁶ Cf. the uses of the verb *ἀμφιχέω* with «sleep» and «grief» in Homer (*Il.* XIV 252 and *Od.* IV 716).

⁸⁷ See *Il.* XIV 160; *H. Apoll.* 379; *Hes., Theog.* 537, *W. & D.* 323, 373.

⁸⁸ See further on *κοῦφος* above on Sim. 8,1-10 W. (App. One, 4) with note 29.

Second, he mentions poverty. At 649-652 he asks of it: «why do you cast shame (καταισχύνω) on my body and νόος?» He then says that, although he knew «noble and good things», poverty taught him «many shameful actions». Here the connection of νόος with moral behaviour is quite apparent. Poverty, like necessity, leads the person to considerations he would not otherwise entertain, ones alien to the way he thought and judged before⁸⁹. It involves him in «shameful actions», originating, it seems, from his νόος.

Three times Theognis speaks of wine affecting νόος. At 498 he describes it as «making (τίθημι) the νόος of the wise and foolish man unsubstantial» (κοῦφος). It negatively affects a person's ability to think and to judge. His mind is «trivial». «Youth» had the same effect upon νόος, as we heard above at 629 (App. One, 69)⁹⁰. At 500 Theognis says further of wine that it serves like fire for silver and gold to «show (δείκνυμι) the νόος of a man.» He then says that it can «disgrace even the wise man.» This passage may suggest the «hidden» nature of νόος. Wine brings it to light. Perhaps the wise person, in particular, keeps his innermost thoughts concealed, but wine can reveal these and sometimes the revelation is a negative one. At 507-508 he further describes wine as «holding (ἔχω) his feet and the νόος in his chest»⁹¹. In this condition he fears that he may do something that will bring «reproach». Wine, removing good judgement and clear thinking, has the power to make the person behave in an unacceptable manner. Once again, the association of νόος with moral behaviour seems evident here.

Section E: Observations. In these 11 passages of Section E we see the ways in which νόος can be affected by outside forces. Most of these forces are negative: old age, e. g., youth, necessity, poverty, and wine. Certain aspects of νόος are prominent in these occurrences. It is associated with intellectual activity (App. One, 64-65, 67-79). It is connected with moral behaviour (App. One, 66, 69-71). Its «hidden» nature too may have been indicated (App. One, 73). Νόος is very much a changeable entity that unfortunately can be altered for the worse.

Section F. Outside Agents Affect νόος.

In 8 passages outside agents, mainly the gods, can influence νόος. Like the passages in Section E, these show how open to outside influences νόος can be.

⁸⁹ See the discussion of these lines in van Groningen (note 20), pp. 257-258.

⁹⁰ See further on κοῦφος above on Sim. 8,1-10 W. (App. One, 4) with note 29.

⁹¹ Cf. Hes., fr. 239,3 where «wine binds feet, hands, tongue, and νόος in bonds».

In 6 passages the gods affect the *νόος* of human-beings. We have heard above that the gods can «know what sort of *νόος* each person has» and that Zeus «knows» well the *νόος* of each individual (Theog. 898, 375, App. One, 23-24). The gods can also cause a man to wander «unhinged of *νόος*» (Arch. 130,5 W., App. One, 57). At 96,1 W. Archilochus asks Glaucus: «who of the gods turned (*τρέπω*) your *νόος* and *φρένες*?» As in *Od.* XIX 479 and Theog. 379 (above, App. One, 22), *νόος* can be «turned». Some change in its functioning results.

At 7,1 W. Semonides begins his poem on women by saying: «god made (*ποιέω*) the *νόος* of woman in different ways»⁹². *Νόος* seems very much to be the 'character' of these women, who reveal their nature by their origin from several different animals⁹³. *Νόος* acts as the seat of their personality traits and their ways of thinking⁹⁴. In the case of these women *νόος* seems to indicate permanent facets of personality. Although their behaviour may change from day to day, their *νόος* has some specific qualities that makes their overall way of acting predictable. At a deep level this *νόος* does not appear to change.

At 42 W. (= Sim. 525), Semonides also says⁹⁵: «the gods easily steal (*κλέπτω*) the *νόος* of men.» In Homer Zeus can 'bewitch' (*θέλω*) the *νόος* of men (*Il.* XII 255). In this fragment of Semonides they seem to be able to remove the ability that human-beings have to think or to make judgements. In contrast, «it is impossible to steal (*κλέπτω*) the *νόος* of Zeus» (Hes., *Theog.* 613). Man's *νόος* is vulnerable in a way that a god's is not.

Theognis mentions the influence of the gods on *νόος* in two passages. At 760, in order that he may sing a «holy song», he prays: «may Apollo guide astraight (*ὀρθόω*) my tongue and *νόος*.» Here again, as in passages treated above, *νόος* and tongue are connected⁹⁶. In this situation the gods can have a positive influence upon thought and speech. The verb *ὀρθόω* may suggest some moral involvement on the part of *νόος*: what he thinks or says will be free from fault⁹⁷. At 705 Theognis describes Persephone as one who «gives forgetfulness (*λήθη*) to mortals, harming (*βλάπτω*) their *νόος*.» Here *νόος* is called the seat of memory.

⁹² On this poem of Semonides see H. Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species*, London 1975; W. J. Verdenius, «Semonides über die Frauen», *Mn* 21, 1968, pp. 132-158, and «Epilegomena zu Semonides Fr. 7», *Mn* 30, 1977, pp. 1-12.

⁹³ Cf. Hes., *W. & D.* 67 where he describes Hermes as placing «a shameful *νόος* in women».

⁹⁴ See Lloyd-Jones (note 92), p. 64, and Verdenius, *Mn* 30, 1977, p. 1.

⁹⁵ On the authorship of this fragment, see Renehan (note 20), pp. 8-9.

⁹⁶ See above on Theog. 1185 (App. One, 7) with note 32.

⁹⁷ Cf. the reference in Pind., *Pyth.* X 68 to a «*νόος ὀρθός*».

This death harms. It can no longer recall past events. Apparently, in the living person, νόος allows this activity.

In a passage ascribed to Stesichorus, *P. Lille* 76abc⁹⁸, a possible restoration of 207 is «the gods put in (τίθημι) another (ἄλλος) νόος for each day»⁹⁹. If this is correct, we have here a clear connection between νόος and the «day», very similar to that found in *Od.* XVIII 134-137. As we have seen in other passages¹⁰⁰, νόος is a changeable entity that can vary with the «day» that it encounters. In this case a «different» νόος may be put in by the gods. They have the power to alter someone's thinking and way of perceiving reality.

In a passage of Sappho, it is a person who affects the νόος of another. At 57,1 she asks: «what country girl has bewitched (θέλω) your νόος, not knowing how to draw her skirts about her ankles?»¹⁰¹ This country girl evidently did not know how to arrange her skirts in a decorous manner. Just like Zeus who 'bewitches' (θέλω) the νόος of the Achaeans at *Il.* XII 255, this girl removes the clear thinking of the man involved. Hesiod, at *W. & D.* 373, likewise warns against the effect a woman can have upon νόος. It proves susceptible to female behaviour.

In the final passage of Section F, a drinking song, Scolion 889, poses an ideal situation. «Would that it were possible to see what each person is like by opening his chest and, having looked at his νόος, to close it up again and to consider a man a friend because of his φρήν that is without deceit.» Here the «hidden» nature of νόος is vividly described¹⁰². It acts as the seat of a person's real thoughts, feelings, and desires. If one could «see» these, one would know if the person was a true friend or not. In this passage νόος and φρήν appear to be synonyms. Both serve as locations of the person's actual attitudes. Only when νόος is seen clearly can behaviour be considered genuine and without deceit¹⁰³.

⁹⁸ On this fragment see P. J. Parsons, «The Lille "Stesichorus"», *ZPE* 26, 1977, pp. 7-36; M. L. West, «Stesichorus at Lille», *ZPE* 29, 1978, pp. 1-3, and M. Haslam, «The Versification of the New Stesichorus (*P. Lille* 76abc)», *GRBS* 19, 1978, pp. 29-57.

⁹⁹ See Parsons (note 98), pp. 21-22.

¹⁰⁰ See above on Sem. 1,3 W. (App. One, 3) with references to other passages in note 27.

¹⁰¹ On the text see Campbell, *Greek Lyric* (note 20), p. 100. On this translation see Kirkwood (note 20), p. 132. See too Fränkel (note 20), p. 208 for an explanation of these lines.

¹⁰² On the «hidden» nature of νόος, see above on Theog. 121 (App. One, 21) with note 47.

¹⁰³ The following fragments mentioning νόος have not been treated because the context is not clear: Alc. 104, Stesich. S 15 i 5, Alc. 43 (B 11,1), and Sim. 511 fr.

Section F: Observations. In 6 passages of this Section, the gods affect *vóos* in some way. They can act positively (App. One, 78) but most often their influence is negative (App. One, 75-77, 79-80). *Nóos* proves very susceptible to their actions. Its intellectual activity is adversely affected. These passages show us two important features of *vóos*: it is «hidden» (App. One, 82) and it is the seat of memory (App. One, 79).

III. CONCLUSION

The above analysis of *vóos* in all the lyric poets except Pindar and Bacchylides illustrates the range of meaning of this psychic term. It also shows how a person relates to the *vóos* within him. In this analysis we divided the relevant passages into six Sections. Section A treated passages in which *vóos* was present, active, or «known» in a person. This Section illustrated some of the range of independent activity that *vóos* could carry on in a person. It also showed certain qualities which *vóos* could have and ways in which it was recognised by others. These passages where *vóos* was «known» suggest its importance as a seat of a person's true nature or character. Section B, in which a person used or acted with *vóos*, contained only three passages. Although the fragmentary nature of the evidence must be borne in mind, these few passages do suggest that *vóos* was not often looked on as an instrument or accompaniment which someone could use or act with. Section C discussed the relationships a person could have with *vóos*. In particular it illustrated the control a person could exert over *vóos*. Section D, in which a person was described in relation to *vóos*, showed again how closely associated an individual's character was to this psychic entity. Sections E and F described outside forces and agents that could act upon *vóos*. These Sections illustrated how vulnerable *vóos* was to outside influences. In no way were its boundaries fixed or defined.

The above analysis suggests certain prominent features of *vóos* (see also the Observations at the end of each Section). First, *vóos* occurs only in the singular. It is found, however, in all four cases. Second, in terms of placement, *vóos*, when it is located, is to be found in the chest region (see note 41). It itself never serves as a location of other psychic entities.

4.9. This article did not treat Corinna 692 fr. 7,9 (fragmentary) and 654 i 28 (τῷ δὲ *vóos* γεγάθι) because her poetry is likely hellenistic. See M. L. West, «Corinna», *CQ* 20, 1970, pp. 277-287.

Nóos is a changeable entity. It appears to vary with the «day» that comes upon it (App. One, 3, 57, 80). This phenomenon helps to explain why *vóos* in others and in oneself varies. Some types of *vóos*, however, seem to be permanent, as, e. g., those found in the different women described by Semonides (7 W., App. One, 76). There may be certain permanent traits of character located in *vóos*. But in other passages it seems that, even when *vóos* has in essence some positive nature, the person himself or outside forces can alter it (App. One, 37, 52-53, 70-72). *Nóos* too changes with the age of the person. Youth can make it «frivolous» (App. One, 69). Hopes also seem to distort it, especially in the young person (App. One, 3-4). In the middle years it grows stronger and flourishes (App. One, 21, 54). Old age harms it (App. One, 67). During a person's lifetime various forces can alter *vóos* for the worse (App. One, 66-77). Wine in particular affects it adversely (App. One, 60, 71-74). It is especially vulnerable also to the action of the gods (App. One, 75-80).

In terms of activity *vóos* seems involved in a whole range of psychological functions: intellectual, emotional, and volitional. When intellectual activity is prominent, it often seems associated with «inner vision» or with some perception that a person has on a deep level (App. One, 5, 15, 31, 40, 67-68). It functions too as a seat of memory (App. One, 79). It may act as well as a location of imagination (App. One, 33). It is quite often connected with the tongue (App. One, 7, 15, 32, 39, 51, 54, 60, 78). The ideal seems to be for speech and *vóos* to be in accord but this does not appear frequently to be the case. *Nóos* does not seem strongly associated with emotion, but in some passages it functions as a location of the attraction or affection that one feels for another (App. One, 33, 38, 46, 81). In terms of volition, *vóos* is often associated with the desires and plans someone may express (App. One, 13-14, 22, 30, 33, 38-40, 48, 51, 61-65).

To a very large degree *vóos* functions as the seat of a person's character or temperament. His deepest qualities appear to be found in *vóos*. He identifies most closely with this psychic entity. Person and *vóos* appear to be in harmony. Although he can exert control over *vóos*, he still seems most often to be in accord with it. Person and *vóos* remain distinct but in large measure *vóos* acts as the seat of someone's disposition and traits of personality. There his inner nature is to be found¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁴ Some passages illustrating this aspect of *vóos* include the following: App. One, 20, 22, 25-29, 37, 54-55, 71, 73. See also the Observations at the end of each Section.

Within the person *vóos* displays certain qualities. These are indicated in particular by the descriptive adjectives qualifying this psychic term (see App. Two). These adjectives show especially how closely a person's moral character was related to *vóos*. The description could be positive: 'trustworthy', 'good', 'noble', or 'pure' (see App. Two). Or it could be negative: 'unjust', 'empty', 'not fitting', 'false', 'insatiate', 'flighty', or 'harsh' (see App. Two).

One striking feature of *vóos* in these poets is its relation to moral behaviour (see, e. g., App. One, 14, 19-20, 55, 59, 63). Within the person it is very much the well-spring of his inclination to justice (App. One, 16, 22-24, 37, 56). It can also be involved in unjust actions, sometimes related to satiety and hybris (App. One, 5, 9, 11, 22, 48, 64). When it is called 'good' or 'noble', *vóos* appears in itself to have a positive moral capacity (see App. Two). But this capacity too can be altered or destroyed (App. One, 37, 52-53, 70-71). Other adjectives as well emphasize the moral aspect of *vóos*: 'trustworthy' and 'pure', e.g., or 'insatiate' and 'harsh'.

Another striking feature of *vóos* within the individual is its «hidden» nature. It acts as the location of a person's true feelings and thoughts and, as such, abides somehow deep within the individual, far out of reach of the gaze of others (App. One, 1, 15, 18, 26-28, 34-35, 73). Someone's behaviour can reflect this *vóos* and this situation is most desirable (App. One, 8, 51). But behaviour too can fail to be in accord with *vóos* and may, in fact, be in direct conflict with it (App. One, 8, 18, 34-35, 46, 82). A person, it appears, may intentionally hide his *vóos* to protect himself. To know, therefore, what another person is actually thinking may require some examination (App. One, 34-35). Theognis at 499-500 refers to wine as the test for showing what *vóos* is really like. It brings *vóos* to the surface, so to speak, and makes it apparent. What it reveals may not always be welcome.

In the lyric poets, as in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Homeric Hymns* at an earlier time, *vóos* seems best described as a «faculty capable of a number of psychological activities». It often signifies a «way of thinking» that a person has or the attitudes or opinions that he holds. But in the lyric poets, even more than in the earlier authors, it functions as a seat of disposition, temperament, and character. Moral traits especially seem prominently associated with it. Here we must bear in mind two points. The nature of this lyric poetry itself with its particular concerns may affect how *vóos* is pictured. Thus, with Theognis, e. g., moral exhortation forms a strong component of his verses. We must always remember too the fragmentary nature of the evidence we are

examining. But what we can say, from the poetry we do possess, is that *vóos* sums up a person best. It is this psychic entity that we should seek out in others, if we wish to know their true attitudes and thoughts. It is in this psychic entity that the individual finds himself most authentically expressed.

SHIRLEY DARCUS SULLIVAN

APPENDIX ONE

vóos in the Greek Lyric Poets
(excluding Pindar and Bacchylides)

Section A: *vóos* as Present, Active, or «Known» in a Person.

Passage	Description	Syntax	Aspects
1. Sol. 17 W. (= 21 G.-P.)	«In every way the <i>vóos</i> of the gods is hidden from men». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst., ἀφανής)	Nom. s.	I-V-E?-M?
2. Arch. 94,6 W.	«by the <i>vóos</i> of the Olympian gods».	Dat. s.	I?-V?
3. Sem. 1,3 W.	« <i>vóos</i> is not in men». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst.)	Nom. s.	I-V
4. Sim. 8,10 W. (= Sem. 29 D.)	«foolish to whom <i>vóos</i> lies in this way». (<i>κεῖμαι</i>)	Nom. s.	I-V-M?
5. Theog. 631	«to whom <i>vóos</i> is not stronger than θυμός». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst., κρέσσων)	Nom. s.	I-V
6. Theog. 622	«The same <i>vóos</i> is present to all men». (<i>ἔνειμι</i> , αὐτός)	Nom. s.	I-V-M?
7. Theog. 1185	« <i>vóos</i> is a good thing and the tongue». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst., ἀγαθόν)	Nom. s.	I-V-M?
8. Theog. 88	«if <i>vóos</i> within is trustworthy». (<i>ἔνειμι</i> , πιστός)	Nom. s.	I-V-E?-M
9. Sol. 4,7 W. (= 3 G.-P.)	« <i>vóos</i> of the leaders of the people is unjust». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst., ἄδικος)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
10. Sol. 11,6 W. (= 15 G.-P.)	« <i>vóos</i> to you all is empty». (<i>εἰμι</i> underst., χαλνός)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
11. Sol. 6,4 W. (= 8 G.-P.)	«to whom <i>vóos</i> is not fitting». (<i>εἰμι</i> , ἄρτιος)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
12. Theog. 154	«someone, to whom <i>vóos</i> is not fitting». (<i>εἰμι</i> , ἄρτιος)	Nom. s.	I-V-M

Passage	Description	Syntax	Aspects
13. Theog. 202	«The νόος of the gods prevails». (ὑπερέχω)	Nom. s.	I-V-E?-M
14. Theog. 377	«How does your [Zeus] νόος endure to hold in the same esteem sinners and the just man?» (τολμάω, ἔχω)	Nom. s.	I-V-E?-M
15. Theog. 1163	«Eyes, tongue, ears, and νόος grow in the chests of the wise». (φύω)	Nom. s.	I-V
16. Theog. 395	«νόος thinks just things». (φρονέω)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
17. Theog. 397	«νόος does not follow the worthless person in good or evil situations». (ἔπομαι)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
18. Theog. 121	«if νόος of a friend has escaped notice, being untrue». (λανθάνω, ψυδρός)	Nom. s.	I-V-E-M
19. Theog. 686	«Some people, money holds in check, others, νόος». (εἶργω)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
20. Theog. 1053	«The θυμός and νόος of the foolish flutter about». (πέτομαι)	Nom. s.	I-V
21. Sol. 27,11 W. (= 23 G.-P.)	«νόος is strengthened». (καταρτύω)	Nom. s.	I-V-M
22. Theog. 379	«if νόος is turned to moderation or pride». (τρέπω)	Nom. s.	I-V-E?-M
23. Theog. 898	«the god knowing νόος, the sort that each person has». (γινώσκω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
24. Theog. 375	Zeus, «you know well the νόος and θυμός of each». (οἶδα)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
25. Theog. 598	«man, who knows your νόος better». (οἶδα)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
26. Theog. 125	«You would not know the νόος of a man or woman». (οἶδα)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
27. Theog. 367	«I am not able to know the νόος of the citizens, which they have». (γινώσκω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
28. Theog. 1184 a	as in 27.	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
29. Theog. 439	«foolish is he who holds my νόος under surveillance». (ἔχω ἐν φυλακῇσιν)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M

Passage	Description	Syntax	Aspects
<i>Section B: Person Acts in, by, or with νόος.</i>			
30. Theog. 1052	«Take counsel with your deep φρήν and good νόος». (βουλεύω, αγαθός)	Dat. s./C-I	I-V-M
31. Theog. 1237	«Strive to understand a saying with your νόος». (συνοράω)	Dat. s./C-I	I
32. Theog. 365	«Check yourself in your νόος». (έχω)	Dat. s./loc.	I

Section C: A Person Has a Direct Relationship with νόος.

33. Sa. 96,2	«holding νόος in this direction often». (έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-E
34. Theog. 1016	«to test friends, what νόος they have». (έξετάζω, έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
35. Theog. 814	«I will know of my enemies, what νόος they have». (οίδα, έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
36. Arch. 185,6 W.	fox, «having a cunning νόος». (έχω, πυκνός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I
37. Theog. 792	«and among the good may I have a noble νόος». (έχω, έσθλός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
38. Theog. 87	«do not hold νόος and φρένες in another direction». (έχω άλλη)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E
39. Theog. 91	«who holds νόος in two ways with one tongue». (έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
40. Theog. 461	«Do not hold νόος on impossible deeds». (έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E
41. Theog. 74	«Few have a trustworthy νόος». (έχω, πιστός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
42. Theog. 698	«Few have a trustworthy νόος». (έχω, πιστός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
43. Theog. 109	«Evil persons have an insatiate νόος». (έχω, άπληστος)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
44. Theog. 580	«I hate the evil man who has the unsubstantial νόος of a small bird». (έχω, κουφος)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M

<i>Passage</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Syntax</i>	<i>Aspects</i>
45. Theog. 1267	«A child and a horse have a similar νόος». (ἐχω, ὁμοῖος)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
46. Theog. 89	«either love me, putting on a pure νόος». (τίθημι, καθαρός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
47. Scol. 901,2	«a lovely woman, putting on a pure νόος». (τίθημι, καθαρός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
48. Sol. 4 c 3 W. (= 5 G.-P.)	«place great νόος in measure». (τίθημι, μέγας)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
49. Sim. 581,1	«Who, trusting in νόος, would praise Cleobulus?» (πίσυνος, αἰνέω)	Dat. s./w. adj.	I
50. Alc. 363,1	«he sends his νόος soaring high». (ἀέρρω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
51. Sol. 34,3 W. (= 29b G.-P.)	«I would show forth a harsh νόος». (ἐκφαίνω, τραχύς)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
52. Theog. 36	«you will destroy the existing νόος». (ἀπόλλυμι, ἐών)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
53. Theog. 1271	«You have destroyed a noble νόος by your greed». (ἀπόλλυμι, ἐσθλός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M

Section D: A Person Is Described in relation to νόος.

54. Sol. 27,13 W. (= 23 G.-P.)	«a person is best in νόος and tongue». (εἰμι underst., ἀριστος)	Acc. s./resp.	I-V-M?
55. Sim. 542,2	«to become truly good in νόος». (γίγνομαι)	Dat. s./resp.	I-V-E?-M
56. Sim. 26A P. (= 85,4 D.)	Archedice, «was not lifted up in νόος to arrogance». (αἶρω)	Acc. s./resp.	I-V-M
57. Arch. 130,5 W.	«he wanders unhinged of νόος». (πλανάω, παρήγορος)	Gen. s./w. adj.	I-V
58. Theog. 223	«that person is foolish, harmed of a noble νόος». (βλάπτω, ἐσθλός)	Gen. s./w. verb	I-V-E?-M
59. Theog. 1025	«wretched persons in evil times are more frivolous in νόος». (εἰμι, ματαιότεροι)	Acc. s./resp.	I-V-M
60. Theog. 480	«whoever passes the measure of drinking is no longer master of tongue and νόος». (εἰμι underst., καρτερός)	Gen. s./obj. gen.	I-M

<i>Passage</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Syntax</i>	<i>Aspects</i>
61. Theog. 142	«Gods complete everything according to their νόος». (τελέω)	Acc. s./κατά	I-V-M
62. Theog. 350	«a divinity who would complete these things according to my νόος». (τελέω)	Acc. s./κατά	I-V-M
63. Scol. 908,2	«he has honour according to my νόος». (έχω, τιμή)	Acc. s./κατά	I-V-M

Section E: Outside Objects Affect νόος.

64. Theog. 633	«take counsel on whatever comes to your νόος». (βουλεύω, δ έρχεται)	Acc. s./έπί	I
65. Theog. 1054	«Counsel leads even a noble νόος to good». (βουλή, άγω, έσθλός)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
66. Arch. 124 b W.	«Stomach led νόος and φρένες into shamelessness». (γαστήρ, παράγω, άναιδείη)	Acc. s./d.o.	E-I
67. Mim. 5,8 (= I G.-P.)	old age, «harms eyes and νόος». (γήρας, βλάπτω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I
68. Theog. 203	«these things deceive the νόος of men». (τάδε, άπατάω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V
69. Theog. 629	«Youth and young impetuosity make νόος unsubstantial». (ήβη, νεότης, έπικουφίζω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
70. Theog. 196	Necessity, «makes νόος reckless». (τίθημι, τλήμων)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
71. Theog. 650	Poverty, «why do you shame my body and νόος?» (πενίη, κατασχύνω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
72. Theog. 498	Wine, «makes the νόος of the wise and foolish man unsubstantial». (οίνος, τίθημι, κοῦφος)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
73. Theog. 500	«Wine showed the νόος of a man». (οίνος, δείκνυμι)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M
74. Theog. 507	«Wine holds feet and νόος in the chest». (οίνος, έχω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-M

Section F: Outside Agents Affect νόος.

75. Arch. 96,1 W.	«Glaucus, who of the gods, having turned your νόος and φρένες?» (τρέπω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-E-V
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<i>Passage</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Syntax</i>	<i>Aspects</i>
76. Sem. 7,1 W.	«God made νόος differently». (ποιέω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
77. Sem 42 W. (= Sim. 525)	«Gods easily steal the νόος of men». (κλέπτω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V
78. Theog. 760	«May Apollo guide astraight my tongue and νόος». (ὁρθόω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V
79. Theog. 705	Persephone, «gives forgetfulness to mortals, harming νόος». (βλάπτω)	Gen. s./w. verb	I
80. Stes. P. Lille 76abc 207	? «the gods put in another νόος». (τίθημι, (?) ἄλλος)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E?-M
81. Sa. 57,1	«What country girl bewitched your νόος?» (θέλω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M
82. Scol. 889,2	«looking at νόος». (εἰσπράω)	Acc. s./d.o.	I-V-E-M

APPENDIX TWO

Descriptive Adjectives with νόος

<i>Passage</i>	<i>App. One</i>	<i>Adjective</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
Theog. 1052	B.30	ἀγαθός	'good', 'noble'.
Sol. 4,7 W.	A.9	ἀδικος	'unjust', 'wrong-doing'.
Stes. P. Lille 76abc 207	F.80	(?) ἄλλος	'other', 'another'.
Theog. 109	C.43	ἄπληστος	'insatiate', 'not to be filled'.
Sol. 6,4 W.	A.11	ἄρτιος	'fitting', 'suitable'.
Theog. 154	A.12	ἄρτιος	'fitting', 'suitable'.
Sol. 17 W.	A.1	ἀφανής	'hidden', 'obscure'.
Theog. 622	A.6	αὐτός	'the same'.
Theog. 792	C.37	ἐσθλός	'noble', 'good'.
Theog. 1271	C.53	ἐσθλός	'noble', 'good'.
Theog. 223	D.58	ἐσθλός	'noble', 'good'.
Theog. 1054	E.65	ἐσθλός	'noble', 'good'.
Theog. 36	C.52	ἔων	'the existing', 'the present'.
Theog. 89	C.46	καθαρός	'pure', 'honest', 'clean'.
Scol. 901,2	C.47	καθαρός	'pure', 'free from guilt'.
Theog. 580	C.44	κοῦφος	'unsubstantial', 'empty'.
Theog. 498	E.72	κοῦφος	'unsubstantial', 'empty'.
Theog. 631	A.5	κρέσσων	'stronger', 'mightier'.

<i>Passage</i>	<i>App. One</i>	<i>Adjective</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
Sol. 4 c 3 W.	C.48	μέγας	'great', 'mighty'.
Theog. 1267	C.45	ὁμοῖος	'similar', 'alike'.
Theog. 88	A.8	πιστός	'trustworthy', 'faithful'.
Theog. 74	C.41	πιστός	'trustworthy', 'faithful'.
Theog. 698	C.42	πιστός	'trustworthy', 'faithful'.
Arch. 185,6 W.	C.36	πυκνός	'wise', 'clever'.
Theog. 196	E.70	τλήμων	'reckless', 'bold', 'daring'.
Sol. 34,3 W.	C.51	τραχύς	'harsh', 'relentless'.
Sol. 11,6 W.	A.10	χαῦνος	'empty', 'frivolous'.
Theog. 121	A.17	ψυδρός	'lying', 'false'.