La conception de l’Étre chez Mélissus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/emerita.1985.v53.i1.686Abstract
The author tries to demonstrate that the abstract world and the sensible one are independent one from the other in Melissus. The world of physical phaenomena does not arise from the abstract Being according to Melissus, contrary to the opinion held by other philosophers, specially by Parmenides. Melissus' opinion is the first step to deny the abstract Being postulated afterwards by the Sophists.
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